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MISAPPROPRIATION OF HUMAN EGGS AND




As technological breakthroughs change the world, old legal
theories may seem inadequate to address new legal problems.1 Is-
sues surrounding human body products are particularly challenging
to courts and scholars attempting to address the problems of human
material within a legal context.2 In particular, cases involving doc-
tors' misappropriation of human eggs or embryos present especially
emotional concerns.
3
Some of these cases may be influenced by a decision on a re-
lated issue, misappropriation of human cells. Moore v. Regents of
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Professor Scott Howe, for helpful comments throughout the writing process.
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1. See Michael J. Markett, Note, Genetic Diaries: An Analysis of Privacy
Protection in DNA Data Banks, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 185, 185 (1996) (not-
ing that "[r]apid advances in DNA technology have outpaced American courts
and legislatures").
2. See infra notes 73-95, 229-80 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 31-41 and accompanying text.
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the University of California4 involved the alleged misappropriation
for profit of cells from a patient's excised spleen. 5 In Moore, the
California Supreme Court held that no claim for conversion of the
cells would lie.6 Two of the court's bases for this holding were, first,
that Moore had abandoned the spleen cells and thus lacked owner-
ship interest in them,7 and second, that allowing a conversion claim
would discourage medical research.8 The Moore holding may have
already affected the Irvine fertility cases,9 which concern doctors'
misappropriation of human eggs and embryos at the University of
California at Irvine (UCI). ° At a fertility clinic there, doctors im-
planted human eggs and embryos into other patients without the do-
nors' knowledge or consent." In two of the ensuing lawsuits, the
trial court granted the defendant doctors' demurrers to conversion
claims, although with leave to amend. 12 The defendants' moving pa-
pers relied heavily on Moore.
13
Human reproduction concerns some of society's most deeply
held values. It arouses the most sensitive of personal concerns,
4. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 793 P.2d 479,
271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990). For a fuller discussion of the case, see infra notes
181-219 and accompanying text.
5. See id. at 126, 793 P.2d at 481, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
6. See id. at 147, 793 P.2d at 497, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
7. See id. at 136-37, 793 P.2d at 488-89, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 155-56.
8. See id. at 144, 793 P.2d at 494, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
9. See supra notes 125-70 and accompanying text.
10. See supra notes 125-70 and accompanying text.
11. See Davan Maharaj, Egg Theft Charged in UCI Fertility Case, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 1997, at B4.
12. See Clay v. Asch, No. 752294 (Orange County Super. Ct. Nov. 17,
1995) (Minute Order); Challender v. Regents, No. 748303 (Orange County
Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 1996) (Minute Order). The demurrers were granted with
leave to amend and the conversion claim was restated in amended complaints
and not demurred to. See First Amended Complaint at 15, Clay v. Asch, No.
752294 (Orange County Super. Ct. Nov. 17, 1995) (Minute Order); Second
Amended Complaint at 12, Challender v. Regents, No. 748303 (Orange
County Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 1996) (Minute Order). Activity in the cases was
then stayed to facilitate pending settlement negotiations.
13. See Defendant Ricardo H. Asch's Memorandum of Points and Authori-
ties in Support of Demurrer to Plaintiffs' Complaint at 4, Clay v. Asch, No.
752294 (Orange County Super. Ct. Nov. 17, 1995) (Minute Order); Demurrers
by the Regents of the University of California to Plaintiffs' First Amended
Complaint at 14, Challender v. Regents, No. 748303 (Orange County Super.
Ct. Apr. 3, 1996) (Minute Order).
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affecting an individuals' sense of sexual adequacy, personal identity,
and connection to the future. Misappropriation of reproductive mate-
rial has lifelong implications, since it may mean the victims are fore-
closed from becoming parents or, even more disturbingly, that their
biological children are being raised, without permission, by unrelated
families. This article argues that these concerns should be accorded
appropriate weight, and that to do so, courts should recognize the tort
of conversion in this context. Part II proposes that a relational view
of the problem should be applied; Part III discusses related cases and
scholarship; Part IV discusses the tort of conversion and its applica-
tion to misappropriation of eggs and embryos; and Part V concludes
that conversion claims should be allowed in these cases.
II. A RELATIONAL VIEW OF THE ISSUES
Judge John T. Noonan wrote about the importance of dropping
the mask of impersonality in the law. He stressed the "enormous"
evils produced by the "neglect of persons" in legal analysis.14 Simi-
larly, Immanuel Kant stressed the importance of considering legal is-
sues in light of social relationships. 15 Thus, the Kantian reasoner
14. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 7, 18-19
(1976).
15. Professor Radin traces to Kant the argument that property and contract
must be considered part of social relationships. MARGARET JANE RADIN,
CONTESTED COMMODITIES 57 (1996) [hereinafter RADIN, CONTESTED
COMMODITIES] (citing IMMANUEL KANT, Metaphysical First Principles of The
Doctrine of Right ("Rechtshlehre"), in THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 82-95
(Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1797)).
Radin has also noted psychologist Carol Gilligan's focus on relational
thinking. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1699, 1712 & n.36 (1990) [hereinafter Radin, The Pragmatist
and the Feminist] (citing CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE:
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 100 (1982)). Gilli-
gan argued that women's moral perspective tends to be based on an ethic of
care, while men's tends to be based on an ethic of justice. See GILLIGAN, su-
pra, at 100. Her theories have strongly influenced feminist legal scholarship.
See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Perspectives on the Ideological Impact of
Legal Education upon the Profession, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1259, 1260 & n.7
(1994).
Radin's initial development of her relational approach to property pre-
dated Gilligan's work. See Margaret Jane Radin, Lacking a Transformative
Social Theory: A Response, 45 STAN. L. REV. 409, 423 (1993). Radin has
criticized Gilligan's connection of perspective to gender. See Radin, The
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disapproves of "objectification," that is, "failure to resPect in theory
and to make space in practice for the human subject."' Building on
this philosophical foundation, Professor Radin has advocated a rela-
tional or personhood analytic viewpoint. 17  This approach rejects
blind and impersonal legal reasoning, and instead calls for pragmatic
consideration of personal concerns. Applying this approach to the
analysis of property rights, Radin classifies property into two catego-
ries: "personal," which "denote[s] the kind of property that indi-
viduals are attached to as persons," and "fungible," which "denote[s]
the kind of property that individuals are not attached to except as a
source of money."'18 The categories are not rigid. Radin gives the
example of a wedding ring, which could be fungible in the jeweler's
display case, but personal once it takes on "symbolic emotional sig-
nificance" to the spouse who wears it. 19 "Personal" property, Radin
argues, should not be as freely alienable as fungible property.
2 0
In her relational analysis, Professor Radin concluded that neither
complete commodification-everything in markets-nor universal
noncommodification-nothing in markets-is the best approach to
solving questions about the appropriate relationship of things to the
market.2 1 Describing herself as a pragmatist,22 she argues that once a
Pragmatist and the Feminist, supra note 15, at 1712 (arguing that the associa-
tion of a relational approach with women is mistaken, since both men and
women have used the approach).
16. RADIN, CONTESTEDCOMMODITIES, supra note 15, at 155.
17. See id. at 57-58; see also Michelle Bourianoff Bray, Personalizing Per-
sonalty: Toward a Property Right in Human Bodies, 69 TEx. L. REv. 209,
239-40 (1990) (applying Radin's personhood analysis to urge that "individu-
als' interests in their bodies should be protected as property interests because
the body is central to the individuals' sense of identity").
18. MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 2 (1993) [herein-
after RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY].
19. Id. at 16; see also Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34
STAN. L. REV. 957, 959 (1982).
20. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1849, 1907 (1987) [hereinafter Radin, Market-Inalienability]. Elsewhere, Ra-
din explores the double meaning of "alienation" as both "transfer" and "es-
trangement," and notes that the two can "harbo[r] an ironic pun about capitalist
private property." MARGARET J. RADIN, The Rhetoric of Alienation, in
REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 18, at 192-93 (discussing the capital-
ist, Marxist and popular meanings of alienation) [hereinafter Radin, The Rheto-
ric ofAlienation].
21. See, e.g., RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 15, at xiii.
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commodity is categorized as "personal," the next step is to determine
what action would best protect the personal interests. This is not al-
ways simple, particularly in instances where both commodification
and noncommodification may have harmful effects on persons, pro-
ducing a "double bind. 23 For example, a double bind occurs in the
analysis of prostitution. If sexual intercourse is determined to be
market inalienable, that would have the harmful effect of depriving
some poor women of an otherwise available means of support. But
if it is commodified, that might have the harmful effect of "un-
leash[ing] market forces onto the shaping of our discourse regarding
sexuality.... ,2 Therefore, Radin suggests, the best approach to
prostitution may be "incomplete commodification": decriminalizing
prostitution so that women can be paid for the work, while regulating
it and declaring prostitution contracts unenforceable.
25
Radin acknowledges the continuing debate over how to catego-
rize human eggs and embryos, but leaves the resolution of the issue
open.26 It seems clear that human eggs and embryos are of such in-
tensely individual significance that, if they are property at all,27 they
fit into Radin's "personal" category.28
When eggs or embryos are misappropriated, their donors suffer
the deep "psychological harm of knowing that their genetic children
will exist in the world without any connection to them.",29 This arti-
cle proposes that a relational view should guide the analysis of issues
raised by misappropriation of human eggs and embryos. In other
words, the analysis should be guided by careful attention to the deli-
cate balance of human flourishing.
30
22. See, e.g., RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 18, at 1-2.
23. See RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 15, at 127.
24. Id. at 133.
25. See id. at 134-35.
26. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 20, at 1856 & n.33.
27. Whether human eggs and embryos should be classified as property is
examined infra notes 229-280 and accompanying text.
28. See RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 15, at 57-58.
29. Lori B. Andrews, The Legal Status of the Embryo, 32 LOY. L. REV.
357, 405 (1986) [hereinafter Andrews, Legal Status of the Embryo]. Andrews
points out that "The traumatic nature of such a situation has been emphasized
in the adoption literature .... [Birth parents feel] loss, pain, mourning, and a
continuing sense of caring for that long vanished child." Id. at 405 n.260.
30. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 20, at 1937 (stating that
our "best conception of human flourishing" ought to inform our analysis of
January 1999]
386 LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW [Vol. 32:381
III. IN VITRO FERTILIZATION: BACKGROUND
A. Vulnerability of Those Seeking In Vitro Fertilization
[W]hen Rachel saw that she [bore] Jacob no children, Ra-
chel envied her sister; and she said unto Jacob, "Give me
children, or else I die!"
31
Rachel's story shows that the intense desire to have children is
as old as early recorded history. Rachel solved her problem through
a surrogacy arrangement: she urged her husband to impregnate her
maid and then raised the two resulting children as her own.
32
For contemporary couples, infertility can be no less devastating
than it was for Rachel.33 The infertile person may feel the need to
have children "to make life worth living, ' 3 4 and report feeling "less
fulfilled if they did not have a child. 3 As a result, persons of both
sexes have often found infertility "extremely stressful," experiencing
feelings of "anxiety, guilt, depression, anger, denial, and isolation."
36
They are "likely to feel inadequate at the core of their being," and
feel driven to try every alternative available.
37
While adoption is a possibility for some childless couples, fewer
children are available for adoption now than in the past,38 and not all
market alienability). Radin believes the best view of human flourishing will




33. See JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE
NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 98 (1994) [hereinafter ROBERTSON,
CHILDREN OF CHOICE] (describing couples' anguish at being infertile).
34. Lori B. Andrews & Lisa Douglass, Alternative Reproduction, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 623, 627 (1991) (quoting Ann Lalos et al., The Wish to Have a
Child, 72 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVIA 476 (1985)).
35. Id. (quoting Victor J. Callan & John F. Hennessey, Emotional Aspects
and Support in In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer Programs, 5 J. IN
VITRO FERTILIZATION & EMBRYO TRANSFER 290, 293 (1988)).
36. Id. at 629.
37. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 33, at 98; see also
Deborah Kay Walther, "Ownership" of the Fertilized Ovum In Vitro, 26 FAM.
L.Q. 235, 237 (1992) (stating that "[c]ommon feelings such as loss of control,
isolation from friends and family, depression and grief may seem overwhelm-
ing to the couple who are denied a child they so earnestly wish to conceive.").
38. See ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 33, at 98.
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infertile couples have the option of adopting.39 Other couples reject
adoption because they want a genetic connection to their children.
40
Men may desire biological parenthood to confirm their virility, just
as women may desire it to confrm their femininity.4 It is with these
intense feelings that patients present themselves for fertility treat-
ment.
B. The Process of ln Vitro Fertilization
In vitro fertilization (IVF)42 allows couples who have been un-
able to achieve coital pregnancy the opportunity to experience par-
enting of their own biological children. It is an expensive, 43 arduous,
and risky process.
44
In order to increase the woman's egg production, and thereby
increase the chances for success, the first phase of the treatment in-
volves the use of drugs to stimulate ovulation.45 The drugs are ad-
ministered daily by needle for a two-week period,46 thereby stimu-
lating the ovaries to increase production from the usual one egg to
perhaps twenty eggs per month.47 The shots are painful and cause
unnatural bloating and sharp mood swings.48 They also subject the
39. For example, adoption agencies prefer married couples over single per-
sons, and older or homosexual couples may find themselves entirely excluded
from the process. See Andrews & Douglass, supra note 34, at 627 & n. 11.
40. See id. at 627.
41. See id. at 628.
42. See infra app.1 for definitions of this and other scientific terms used in
this article.
43. A single IVF costs approximately $7,500. See Jean Voutsinas, In Vitro
Fertilization, 12 PROB. L.J. 47, 49 (1994). The average cost for a successful
delivery ranges from $114,286 to $800,000, depending on individual compli-
cations. See Keith Alan Byers, Infertility and In Vitro Fertilization, 18 J.
LEGAL MED. 265, 285 (1997).
44. Feminists have criticized the process as "part of [women] making a pa-
triarchal bargain rather than being a free choice or a gift." Leslie Bender,
Teaching Feminist Perspectives on Health Care Ethics and Law: A Review Es-
say, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1251, 1267 (1993) (citing Judith Lorber, Choice, Gift,
or Patriarchal Bargain? Women's Consent to In Vitro Fertilization in Male
Infertility, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 177 (Helen B.
Holmes & Laura M. Purdy eds., 1992)).
45. See Voutsinas, supra note 43, at 48.
46. See Byers, supra note 43, at 277.
47. See Voutsinas, supra note 43, at 48.
48. See Byers, supra note 43, at 277.
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patient to other risks,4 9 including the possibility of kidney failure.50
The patient is required to undergo daily blood testing and ultrasound
examinations l to determine when ovulation will occur and to allow
the doctor to remove the eggs. -52 The complexity, cost, and difficulty
of the process of egg removal dictate that the doctor gather more
eggs than will be immediately implanted in the woman.5 3 The op-
eration requires a general anesthetic, thus subjecting the patient to
the additional risk and unpleasantness of being unconscious.
5 4
The period of time between the fertilization of the egg in vitro
and the transfer to the recipient's uterus may be as long as fourteen
days.55 After the embryos are transferred, the couple must wait to
see if any of the embryos implant themselves on the walls of the
woman's uterus.5 6 In addition to the fact that sometimes the embryos
fail to attach themselves to the uterine wall, IVF carries a thirty per-
cent chance of miscarriage. 57 The introduction of multiple embryos
also increases the chance of a multiple pregnancy and the potential
49. One UCI patient described how the medication had overstimulated her
ovaries on the day forty-six eggs were taken from her, causing lightheaded-
ness, bloating, and high blood pressure that prevented a planned retransfer to
her tubes of some of her eggs and her husband's sperm. See Debbie Challen-
der & Susan Littwin, Fertility Fraud: Why One Mother May Never Know Her
Babies, REDBOOK, Dec. 1995, at 87.
50. See Cindy Schreuder, Embryo Issue From American View: Unlike Brit-
ain We Have Little Regulation, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 4, 1996, § 2 (METRO), at 1;
Gina Kolata, As Price of Donor Eggs Rises So Does Debate, ORANGE COUNTY
REG., Mar. 8, 1998, at A16 (discussing renal failure resulting from overstimu-
lation of the ovaries).
51. See Byers, supra note 43, at 277.
52. See Voutsinas, supra note 43, at 48. This is generally done through a
laparoscopy, a surgical procedure in which an incision is made into the naval
area and a tiny telescope is inserted through the incision to bring the ovaries
into view. See Byers, supra note 43, at 278 (quoting Doug Brouen, Childless
See New Hope "In Vitro ", L.A. TIMES (Orange County Edition) Oct. 6, 1985, §
6 (VIEW) at 1). The physician manipulates the needle to remove the eggs
from their follicles. See id.
53. See ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 33, at 99 (stating
that multiple eggs are gathered to increase the chance of pregnancy).
54. See Voutsinas, supra note 43, at 48-49. Alternative procedures have
been developed that do not require general anesthesia but the efficacy of the
alternative procedures have yet to be determined. Id. at 49-50.
55. See id.
56. See Byers, supra note 43, at 280.
57. See id. at 281.
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need for selective reduction of the implanted embryos.58 The whole
process takes a heavy toll on the infertile couple, and requires "a
great commitment of time, energy, and resources." 59 Moreover, it
has "incredibly low success rates."
60
Scientific technology has made it possible to freeze and store
embryos created through IVF but not used in the initial procedure.
61
The doctor freezes, or "cryopreserves," the extra preembryos for fu-
ture use, if the initial transfer does not produce a live birth, or if the
couple desires a subsequent pregnancy. 62 The embryos are first
treated with a solution to protect them from damage during freez-
ing.63 They are then gradually cooled to a temperature of minus-
sixty to minus-eighty degrees centigrade and placed in liquid nitro-
gen for long-term storage. 64 About thirty-five percent of the em-
bryos do not survive the thawing process.
65
With one billion dollars being spent annually on fertility and as-
sisted reproduction programs, clinics are conducting market research
and advertising to attract couples to their facilities.66 People are of-
ten given high hopes which may be unsupported or unjustified.
Clinics may refer to the "success" rates of their programs, without
explaining what they mean by "success," and actually inflate those
success rates. Emotional appeals emphasizing the joys of having a
58. See ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 33, at 99.
59. Deborah Kay Walther, "Ownership" of the Fertilized Ovum In Vitro,
26 FAM. L.Q. 235, 237 (1992).
60. Bender, supra note 44, at 1265.
61. See Wendy Dullea Bowie, Multiplication and Division-New Math for
the Courts: New Reproductive Technologies Create Potential Legal Time
Bombs, 95 DICK. L. REv. 155, 161 (1990).
62. See id. at 162.
63. See id. at 161.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 161-62.
66. See Rick Weiss, Babies in Limbo: Laws Outpaced by Fertility Ad-
vances, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 1998, at Al (stating that the industry is on an
"aggressively entrepreneurial track").
Doctors Ricardo Asch and Jose Balmaceda have co-authored two re-
search reports. See Roberta Lessor et al., An Analysis of Social and Psycho-
logical Characteristics of Women Volunteering to Become Oocyte Donors in
FERTILITY & STERILITY, Jan. 1993, at 65 (stating the objective of designing a
recruitment program); Roberta Lessor et al., A Survey of Public Attitudes To-
ward Oocyte Donation Between Sisters, 5 HUMAN REPRODUCTION 889 (1990).
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child are very common. Little is mentioned of the cost, risk, physical
discomfort, or limited chances of actually having a baby.
In addition to advertising to infertile couples, many fertility
clinics advertise seeking women willing to donate their eggs.6 7 Ad-
vertisements seeking donors run in campus newspapers, 68 and can
even be found on the Internet.
69
The great amounts of money to be made and the attendant dan-
ger of exploitation in this field suggest a need for regulation of in vi-
tro fertilization.70  Regulation through statutory schemes has been
suggested,71 but these schemes may not provide redress for aggrieved
couples. 72 One means of validating their serious loss and providing
them with appropriate redress is to allow aggrieved couples to bring
claims for the tort of conversion.
C. Cases Arising Out of In Vitro Fertilization
1. Cases involving custody of reproductive material
Custody disputes over human reproductive material provide
some illumination for the cases involving misappropriation of eggs
67. See NORTHWEST HUNTINGTON BEACH PENNYSAVER, June 3, 1998 at
23 (advertisement).
68. See UC-IRVINE NEW UNIVERSITY, May 18, 1998, at 10 (advertisement
offering $3500 to a woman who has a European background); UC-IRVINE NEW
UNIVERSITY, June 1, 1998, at 23 (advertisement offering $5,000 to a woman
who has European background); Adrienne Knox, Have Brokers Gone Over-
board for Human Ova?, THE STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Mar. 8, 1998, at 1
(egg broker advertises $35,000 plus expenses for the egg of a Princeton Uni-
versity student).
69. See The Egg Donor Program, How to Become an Egg Donor or Surro-
gate Mother, (last visited Nov. 7, 1998) <http://www.eggdonation.com> (ad-
vertisement offering an egg donor $3000); Tasc Classified Advertising Sec-
tion, Prospective Egg Donors, (last visited Nov. 7, 1998) <http://www.
surrogacy.com/classifieds/eggsum.html> (featuring multiple advertisements
for human eggs).
70. See Byers, supra note 46, at 265 (proposing regulation of the in vitro
industry).
71. See id.
72. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 367(g) (West Supp. 1998) (providing for
imprisonment and fines, but creating any new civil claims, for "unauthorized
use or implantation of sperm, ova, or embryos.").
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or embryos.73 In the major reported custody cases, courts have found
it necessary to discuss whether or not gametic material is property.
In York v. Jones,74 a couple underwent fertility treatment at a
Virginia clinic and, before the procedure was complete, moved to
California.75 When the couple sought to have their "pre-zygote"
transferred to a Los Angeles hospital, 76 a custody dispute arose be-
tween them and the Virginia clinic, and the couple asked the court to
order the transfer.77 The court viewed the case as a contract dispute
and ruled that since the parties' contract referred to the frozen em-
bryos as property, it would treat them as bailed property.78 Accord-
ingly, the court held that the couple stated a claim for detinue. 79 In a
footnote, the court commented that the parties' agreement was con-
sistent with the Ethical Considerations of the American Fertility
73. These cases are to be distinguished from those involving custody of
children born through in vitro fertilization, which are beyond the scope of this
article. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal. 4th 84, 851 P.2d 776, 19 Cal. Rptr.
2d 194 (1993) (husband and wife whose embryo had been implanted in surro-
gate mother were granted custody of the child, with the court holding the sur-
rogate mother was not the "natural mother" of the child). A bizarre circum-
stance arose in one such case, In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 61 Cal. App. 4th
1410, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (1998), in which a husband and wife contracted to
have a child, Jaycee, through implantation of a genetically unrelated embryo in
the womb of a surrogate mother. After Jaycee's birth, the couple separated,
and the husband claimed in the dissolution proceeding that he had no paternal
duties to Jaycee. See id. at 1412, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282. The trial court
"reached an extraordinary conclusion: Jaycee had no lawful parents," reason-
ing that neither the gamete donors, the surrogate, nor the divorcing couple had
all the incidents of parentage. See id. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that the divorcing couple were Jaycee's parents because Jaycee would never
have been born had they not initiated the surrogacy process. See id. at 1428,
72 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
74. 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
75. See id. at 423.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 421.
78. See id. at 424, 427. The agreement provided that in the event of a di-
vorce, ownership of the pre-zygotes would be determined in a "property set-
tlement." Id. at 426.
79. See id. at 427. Detinue is "a possessory action for the recovery of per-
sonal chattels unjustly detained." Durst v. Durst, 193 A.2d 26, 28 (Md. Ct.
App. 1963).
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Society, which identified gametes and embryos as the property of
their donors.
80
Another dispute over custody of reproductive material arose in a
divorce case, Davis v. Davis.8 l The wife wanted to use the couple's
frozen preembryos to have a child, but the husband did not approve
of her use of the preembryos. 82 Therefore, each sought custody of
the preembryos. 83  Unlike in York, the Davises had executed no
written agreement specifying disposition of the frozen embryos in
the event of a dispute or divorce. 84 Finding no statute or case law to
help determine the rightful custodian of the frozen embryos, the
court turned to legal journals85 and to the American Fertility Soci-
ety8 6 for assistance. The court concluded that frozen preembryos are
neither persons nor property but occupy an interim category that en-
titles them to special respect because of their potential for human
life.87 The court awarded custody of the preembryos to the husband
on the ground that "the party wishing to avoid procreation should
prevail."
The California Court of Appeal took the significant step of
identifying a property right in a human body product in Hecht v. Su-
perior Court.9 Hecht involved a dispute over custody of sperm de-
posited in a sperm bank by the deceased partner of the plaintiff.90
80. Id. at 427 n.5 (citing the Ethics Committee of the American Fertility
Society, Ethical Statement on In Vitro Fertilization, 46 FERTILITY AND
STERILITY 89S (Supp. 1986) [hereinafter AFS Ethical Statement]). The cited
provision reads in full: "It is understood that the gametes and concepti are the
property of the donors. The donors therefore have the right to decide at their
sole discretion the disposition of these items, provided disposition is within
medical and ethical guidelines as outlined herein." Id.
81. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
82. See id. at 589.
83. See id. The wife eventually wished to donate the eggs while the hus-
band wanted to dispose of them. See id. at 590
84. See id. at 590.
85. See id. at 590 & nn.3, 5 (citing Note, The Legal Status of Frozen Em-
bryos: Analysis and Proposed Guidelines for a Uniform Law, 17 J. LEGIS. 97
(1990), and Andrews, Legal Status of the Embryo, supra note 29).
86. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596.
87. See id. at 597.
88. Id. at 604.
89. 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (1993).
90. See id. at 840, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 276.
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The deceased partner had stipulated in a "Specimen Storage Agree-
ment" that in the event of his death the semen specimen was to be
released to the plaintiff, who intended to conceive his child posthu-
mously.91 The decedent's adult son and daughter obtained an order
that the sperm be destroyed, and the plaintiff petitioned for a writ va-
cating the order. 92 The court, distinguishing the case from Moore,
93
ruled that the deposited sperm was "property" over which the probate
court had jurisdiction because the contract showed the decedent's
"expectation that he would in fact retain control over the sperm fol-
lowing the deposit., 94 The Hecht court cited both York and Davis, as
well as the American Fertility Society's Ethical Statement to support
the classification of sperm as "property."
95
These cases indicate a willingness by some courts to classify
human eggs and embryos as property, or at least to place them in an
intermediate category between persons and property and determine
that the progenitors have some right of control over them.
2. Cases involving misappropriated eggs or embryos
a. previous and pending cases
There have already been several publicized instances of misap-
propriation of human eggs or embryos. While most have not yet re-
sulted in reported opinions or court cases involving conversion
claims, they illustrate the increasing prevalence of the problem.
Del Zio v. Presbyterian Medical Center96 arose from the first
known attempt at in vitro fertilization. The Del Zios agreed to be
91. See id. at 840-41, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 276-78.
92. See id. at 844, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 279.
93. See id. at 850, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 283. For a discussion of Moore, see
supra notes 181-219 and accompanying text.
94. Hecht, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 846 n.4, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 280-81 n.4. But
see David A. Rameden, Frozen Semen as Property in Hecht v. Superior Court:
One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward, 62 UMKC L. REV. 377, 393 (1993)
(criticizing the Hecht court as not engaging in a theoretical analysis of prop-
erty).
95. See Hecht, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 848, 849, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282, 283
(citing the Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, supra note 80,
at 89S).
96. No. 79-Civ.-3588 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1978), reprinted in MICHAEL H.
SHAPIRO & ROY G. SPECE JR., CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS ON
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part of an experiment in the new procedure, and the husband's sperm
and the wife's egg were mixed. However, a physician at the medical
center, apparently believing that it was morally wrong to conduct
such experiments, destroyed the reproductive material.97 The couple
sued the medical center, and the jury awarded damages for emotional
distress. The judge observed that the jury may have meant to include
conversion damages in that amount.98 Professor John A. Robertson
views the decision as a recognition of the couple's ownership interest
in the human material. 99
A second case involved misuse of gametes, with a doctor's hu-
bris leading to questions about the paternity of as many as seventy
babies. 100 Doctor Cecil Jacobson was well regarded in his field,
having performed the nation's first amniocentesis.' 0' From 1976 to
1988,1°2 at his clinic in Virginia, 1°3 Doctor Jacobson told his patients
BIoETHCs AND LAW 522, 523 (1981).
97. See Andrews, The Legal Status of the Embryo, supra note 29, at 367-
68. Because it is unknown whether the attempt resulted in fertilization, it can-
not be said with certainty whether an embryo was involved. See Christine A.
Djalleta, Comment, Twinkle in a Decedent's Eye: Proposed Amendments to
the Uniform Probate Code in Light of the New Reproductive Technology, 67
TEMP. L. REV. 335, 350 n.119 (1994).
98. See Del Zio, No. 79-Civ.-3588 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1978), reprinted in
MICHAEL H. SHAPIRO & ROY G. SPECE JR., CASES, MATERIALS, AND
PROBLEMS ON BIOETHICS AND LAW 522, 527 (1981). See also Lynne M.
Thomas, Comment, Abandoned Frozen Embryos And Texas Law of Aban-
doned Personal Property: Should There Be a Connection? 29 ST. MARY'S L.J.
255, 278 (1997) (stating, that, because the basis of the jury verdict was unclear,
"arguably, conversion could have been applicable in this [Del Zio] case, which
would thereby imply that embryos are more analogous to property than to life
or as deserving special respect.").
99. See John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early
Embryos, 76 VA. L. REV. 437, 459, 515-17 (1990) (noting the lack of consen-
sus on the status of the early embryo but urging recognition of the couple's de-
cisional authority).
100. See Teri Sforza, Who Rules How Babies are Made?, ORANGE COUNTY
REG., May 28, 1995, at Al; see also Diane M. Gianelli, Fraud Scandal Closes
California Fertility Clinic, AM. MED. NEWS, June 19, 1995, at 1.
101. See Sforza, supra note 100, atAl.
102. See id.
103. See Randolph Goode, Court Backs Up Jacobson Over His Insurer:
Firm Contended It Had No Responsibility to Defend Him, Pay off Lawsuits,
RICHMOND TIMES, Feb. 18, 1995, at B5; Insurer Can't Duck 'Sperm Doctor'
Liability, THE INSURANCE REGULATOR, Mar. 6, 1995, at 8 [hereinafter Insurer
Can't Duck].
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undergoing fertility treatment that he was using sperm from either
anonymous donors' 0 4 or the patients' husbands. 10 5  Instead, he
inseminated approximately 120 of his patients with his own sperm,
fathering perhaps 70 children.1
0 6
Both criminal and civil suits were filed against Doctor Jacobson,
and he was convicted of fraud in 1992.107 Before charges were filed
prosecutors, fearing potential intermarriage among the unsuspecting
but genetically related children, told the patients that Doctor Jacob-
son might be the genetic father of their children.'0 8 Parents filed at
least six civil suits against Jacobson.
10 9
Another case involving misuse of sperm arose in Florida. Mi-
chael and Elizabeth (Betty) Higgins were an infertile couple who
wanted to have biological children together.110 Michael is black and
Betty is white."' In 1994, the couple underwent fertility treatment at
Memorial Hospital, in Jacksonville, Florida." 2 However, when their
twins were born it was discovered that Betty was their biological
mother, but someone other than Michael was the biological father.
The wrong sperm was apparently used, and the children appear
104. See Insurer Can't Duck, supra note 103, at 8.
105. See Goode, supra note 103, at B5.
106. See Sforza, supra note 100, at Al.
107. See Insurer Can't Duck, supra note 103, at 8. Jacobson was convicted
of 52 felony counts "for mail fraud, wire fraud, travel fraud and perjury for
using his own sperm in a series of artificial insemination procedures in which
he had promised to use the sperm of his patient's husband or of an anonymous
donor." Id. At the time of this writing, Doctor Cecil Jacobson is serving a five-
year sentence at a federal prison. He was also ordered to pay $116,805 in fines
and restitution. See Judges Open Door for New Jacobson Suits, WASH. TIMES,
Feb. 20, 1995, at C6.
108. See David Parrish & Kim Christensen, UCI Cases May Spawn Custody
Wars, ORANGE COUNTY REG., July 9, 1995, at Al, available in 1995 WL
5859219.
109. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Jacobson, 48 F.3d 778, 779 (4th
Cir. 1995) (stating that parents brought claims for "various counts of fraud,
battery, negligence, tort of outrage, negligent infliction of emotional distress,
medical malpractice, and child support").
110. See 20/20: A Miracle Gone Wrong: Update on the Higgins Family and
Their In Vitro Twins, (ABC television broadcast, May 23, 1997).
111. See Deborah Sharp, Fla. Suit Highlights In Vitro Industry's Controver-
sies, USA TODAY, Nov. 15, 1996, at 3A.
112. See Mike Stobbe, Alleged Mix-Up Leads to Lawsuit, FLORIDA TIMES-
UNION, Sept. 1, 1997, at A5, available in 1997 WL 11325157.
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white. 1 3  The Higginses sued the hospital in April 1996"' for
negligence." 5 Michael's severe disturbance over discovering that
his wife bore another man's children may have contributed to the
breakup of their marriage. 116
Three cases concerning misappropriation of embryos are pend-
ing in Rhode Island. The Frisnas," 7 the Lamontagnes," 8 and the
Doyles" 9 sued the hospital where they each received fertility treat-
ment, alleging that their frozen embryos were destroyed in contra-
vention of their directions to the hospital.12 0 Some of these embryos
may have been given to other women.
12 1
Problems with misuse of reproductive material have also oc-
curred outside the United States. For example, in the Netherlands, a
couple paid for an in vitro procedure offered by the fertility clinic of
the University Hospital located in Utrecht, so that they could have
their own biological child. 122 The wife gave birth to twins, but one of
the twins was of noticeably darker complexion than the parents and
was discovered to have been fathered by the sperm of a Caribbean
man. 123 The mistake may have occurred because a pipette was not




115. See Ann Davis, High Tech Births Spawn Legal Riddles, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 26, 1998, at B1.
116. See Sharp, supra note 111, at 3A.
117. See Frisna v. Women and Infants Hosp. (R.I. Super. Ct. filed June 24,
1995) (No. 95-4037).
118. See Lamontagne v. Women and Infants Hosp., (R.I. Super. Ct. filed
Aug. 16, 1995) (No. 95-4469). [The author thanks plaintiffs' attorney David J.
Oliveira of Providence, Rhode Island, for making this complaint available and
for providing other information about the pending cases.]
119. See Doyle v. Women and Infants Hosp., (R.I. Super. Ct. filed Aug. 31,
1995) (No. 95-5827).
120. See Frisna, Complaint at 2; Lamontagne, Complaint at 3; Doyle, Com-
plaint at 3.
121. See Weiss, supra note 66, at Al (quoting plaintiffs' attorney David J.
Oliveira).
122. See Dorinda Elliott & Friso Endt, Twins-With Two Fathers,
NEWSWEEK, July 3, 1995, at 38.
123. See id.
124. See id.
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b. the Irvine fertility cases
The best publicized cases involving misappropriation of repro-
ductive material are the Irvine fertility cases.' 25 They arose at the
Center for Reproductive Health, a clinic associated with the Univer-
sity of California at Irvine and run by doctors Ricardo Asch, Jose
Balmaceda, and Sergio Stone.
Before joining the University, Asch and Balmaceda were widely
known for their fertility work.126 Asch, with the help of Balmaceda,
developed the fertilization process known as gamete intra fallopian-
tube transfer, or GIFT, 127 in which mixed eggs and sperm are im-
planted within the fallopian tube. 128 Dr. Asch cultivated his reputa-
tion as a successful fertility doctor, claiming that GIFT greatly in-
creased the chance of having a baby over the traditional in vitro
fertilization technique. 129 In 1990, these doctors, along with Doctor
Sergio Stone, moved their fertility clinic from Garden Grove into the
125. For discussions of the Irvine fertility cases, see Judith F. Daar, Regu-
lating Reproductive Technologies: Panacea or Paper Tiger?, 34 HOUS. L.
REv. 609, 609-14, 637-42 (1997) (pointing out a need for regulation of the fer-
tility industry and calling for reliance on existing regulatory schemes); Karen
T. Rogers, Comment, Embryo Theft: The Misappropriation of Human Eggs at
an Irvine Fertility Clinic Has Raised a Host of New Legal Concerns for Infer-
tile Couples Using New Reproductive Technologies, 26 Sw. U. L. REv. 1133
passim (1997) (discussing custody issues presented by the cases); Rebecca S.
Snyder, Reproductive Technology and Stolen Ova: Who Is the Mother?, 16
LAW AND INEQ. J. 289, 289-90 (1998) (same); Nina Martin, Scrambled Eggs:
A Scandal at a World-Famous Fertility Clinic Has Stirred up a Legal Mess,
CAL. LAW., Oct. 1995, at 21 (summarizing early progress of the cases).
126. See, e.g., Jill Smolowe, The Test-Tube Custody Fight: Victims of the Ir-
vine Stolen-Egg Scandal Go After Twins, TIME, Mar. 18, 1996, at 80 (describ-
ing Asch as a "celebrated fertility specialist").
127. See Richard Kelly Heft, A Fertility Clinic in California is at the Center
of a Storm over Accusations of Illegal Trade in Human Eggs, TEE GUARDIAN,
Sept. 11, 1995, at T8, available in 1995 WL 9943046.
128. See Kim Christensen, et al., 50 Egg Suits Settled, ORANGE COUNTY
REG., July 19, 1997, at B1.
129. See Ellen Goodman, Ethics Needed in the Genetic Warehouse,
CINCINNATI POST, June 13, 1995, at 11A, available in 1995 WL 8621654.
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UCI Medical Center. 130 Doctor Stone apparently did not perform
fertility procedures, but shared in the Center's profits.1
3'
In February, 1994, UCI received a whistle-blower complaint that
accused the doctors of not fully reporting income and of prescribing
an unapproved drug to patients. 132 In September of that year, another
whistle blower accused the doctors of implanting eggs without the
donors' consent, 133 alleging that the doctors "stole eggs from women
undergoing fertility treatments from the late 1980's through the early
1990's, implanting the eggs in other women and funneling others
into research."'134 There have also been allegations of improper han-
dling of records and finances and mail fraud. 135 In response to the
allegations, a panel of academic investigators from other universities
was appointed to investigate the UCI Center for Reproductive
Health. 136 The panel found "plausible evidence" that the doctors im-
planted human eggs without donor consent, as well as evidence of
some of the other alleged violations. 137 At least fifteen births alleg-
edly resulted from unlawful transfers from unconsenting couples.1
3 8
130. See Kim Christensen & Michelle Nicolosi, Money Doesn't Buy Relief
Some Who Received Six-Figure Settlements Still Feel Pain From The UCI Or-
deal, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Aug. 16, 1997, at B2.
131. See Christensen, et al., supra note 128, at B1.
132. See Nick Anderson & Esther Schrader, 50 Couples to get $10 Million to
End UCI Fertility Clinic Suits, L.A. TIMES, July 19, 1997, at Al. The unap-
proved drug was HMG Massone, a fertility drug produced in Argentina and not
approved for use in the United States. See Davan Maharaj, Fertility Doctor
Charged with Egg Theft, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1997, at A3.
133. See Marcida Dodson, 21 More Claims Against UCI's Fertility Clinic
Settled for $4.4 Million, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1997, at B4.
134. Davan Maharaj, Egg Theft Charged in UCI Fertility Case, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 19, 1997, atB1.
135. See Marcida Dodson, Charges of Income Tax Evasion Broaden UCI's
Fertility Scandal, L.A. TIMES, June 21, 1997, at B1.
136. See Anderson & Schrader, supra note 132, at Al.
137. See id. Doctor Asch also admitted to dispensing HMG Massone to two
patients, but the panel found evidence that he gave the unapproved drug to at
least nine. UCI then launched its own investigation where they discovered fi-
nancial misconduct. See Michelle Nicolosi, Negotiations Stretched Under Six-
Month Period, ORANGE COUNTY REG., July 19, 1997, at 18.
138. See Lawrence Eisenberg, What's at Stake in the Trial of Dr. Stone,
ORANGE COUNTY REG., Oct. 5, 1997, at G1.
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Asch resigned and the two other doctors were placed on leave in
June of 1995."9
The allegations relating to the fertility clinic have given rise to
numerous lawsuits. The University filed a lawsuit against the clinic
in May, 1995,140 alleging, among other things, that the Center for
Reproductive Health "transplanted patients' eggs into other patients
without obtaining the donors' consent."'
141
Starting in June, 1995,142 patients enrolled in the fertility clinic
brought 105 civil lawsuits against UCI. 143 At this time, seventy-five
of the cases have settled, costing the university nearly fifteen million
dollars. 144 The monetary awards for these settlements range up to
$650,000 and average more than $200,000 apiece. 145 About twenty
cases remain unsettled, 146 including two naming Comell University
as a recipient of some of the missing eggs or embryos for research
purposes. 47 The scandal also prompted passage of a California stat-
ute that criminalizes misappropriation of eggs or embryos.
48
The doctors' conduct caused grave consequences for many peo-
ple. Some fertility patients found themselves in the disturbing posi-
tion of knowing that someone else was raising their genetic children
without their consent. 149 For example, Loretta and Basilio Jorge
139. See Diane M. Gianelli, Fraud Scandal Closes California Fertility
Clinic, AM. MED. NEWs, June 19, 1995, at 1, available in 1995 WL 10008857.
140. See Anderson & Schrader, supra note 132, at Al.
141. First Am. Compl. at 2, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Asch (Orange
County Super. Ct. filed May 25, 1995) (No. 747155).
142. See Dodson, supra note 133, at B4.
143. See Kim Christensen, 21 Additional Settlements in UCI Egg Cases,
ORANGE COUNTY REG., Sept. 27, 1997, at B4 available in 1997 WL 7445643.
144. See Marcida Dodson, Fertility Patient OKs $460,000 UC Settlement,
L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 20, 1998, at B4 [hereinafter Dodson, $460,000 Settlement].
145. See Dodson, supra note 133, at B4.
146. See Dodson, $460,000 Settlement, supra note 144, at B4.
147. See First Am. Compl. at 74, Dubont v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
(Orange County Super. Ct. filed Nov. 9, 1995) (No. 755021); Beasley v. Re-
gents of the Univ. of Cal. (Orange County Super. Ct. filed Oct. 31, 1995)
(No.755023). See also Jack McCarthy, Grieving over Lost Embryos, PRESS-
ENTERPRISE (Riverside, Cal.) Aug. 25, 1997, at Al (recounting alleged ship-
ment of three of plaintiff Kimberley DuBont's embryos to Cornell).
148. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 367(g) (West Supp. 1998) (providing for im-
prisonment and fines for unauthorized use or implantation of sperm, ova or
embryos).
149. See Challender & Littwin, supra note 49, at 84 (describing the Chal-
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alleged that her eggs were stolen by the doctors and transferred to
another woman who gave birth to twins.' 50 The Jorges received a
$650,000 settlement for their claim.'
Most of the cases involve misappropriation of eggs rather than
embryos, but at least three couples have filed custody suits claiming
that they are the biological parents of children born to other cou-
ples.152  In one such case, a married couple, Renee Ballou and
Wesley Presson, sought fertility treatment. 3  Doctor Asch per-
formed a GIFT on Ballou, l1 4 but she was ultimately unable to con-
ceive a child at the fertility clinic.' 5 5 Presson and Ballou later
learned that one or more of the eggs taken from Ballou had been fer-
tilized with Presson's sperm 156 and then placed into the body of an-
other woman without their consent.' 5 7 The woman who received the
implant bore a son who is allegedly the biological child of Ballou
and Presson. 15 8 In suits against the clinic, plaintiffs alleged multiple
claims for such torts as conversion; negligence; fraud; intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress; negligent spoliation of evidence; in-
tentional spoliation of evidence; 159 conspiracy; and battery. 6 °
lenders' anguish at learning that they had "unwittingly given away two ba-
bies"); Karen Brandon, Emerging Fertility Clinic Scandal Has Californians
Rapt, CI. TRIB., Mar. 24, 1996, at A6 (quoting plaintiff Renee Ballou as say-
ing, "He [Asch] basically took my hopes and dreams and gave them to some-
one else"); McCarthy, supra note 147, at Al (recounting patient Pamela
Kaoud's sense of betrayal because she will not know if she has additional bio-
logical children until a child appears and says, "Guess what?").
150. See Christensen, supra note 143, at B4.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See Compl. at 7, Ballou v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. (Orange County
Super. Ct. filed June 5, 1996) (No.759238).
154. See id.
155. See Brandon, supra note 149, at A6.
156. See Compl. at 10, Ballou v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., (Orange
County Super. Ct. filed June 5, 1996) (No. 759238).
157. See id. at 9.
158. See id. at 10; see also Dodson, $460,000 Settlement, supra note 144, at
B4 (fertility test revealed Ballou was the genetic mother of the child).
159. This claim is no longer recognized in California. See Cedars-Sinai
Med. Ctr. v. Superior Ct., 18 Cal. 4th 1, 18, 954 P.2d 511, 521, 74 Cal. Rptr.
2d 248, 258 (Cal. 1998) (holding that "there is no tort remedy for intentional
spoliation of evidence by a party to a cause of action to which the spoliated
evidence is relevant in cases where ... the spoliation victim knows or should
have known of the alleged spoliation before the trial...").
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Doctors Asch and Balmaceda fled the country in 1995 following
the accusations of wrongdoing.' 61 Asch, a native of Argentina, is re-
ported to be operating a fertility clinic' 62 and teaching at a univer-
sity 163 in Mexico City. Balmaceda is reportedly operating a fertility
clinic in his native Chile.16 4 Both are wanted on charges arising out
of events at the clinic.
165
Doctor Stone, who remained in the United States, was convicted
on October 30, 1997, of "nine counts of mail fraud for listing his
partners' names on billing forms for procedures performed by doc-
tors in training."' 66 Stone reportedly admitted to prosecutors that he
and other physicians at the Center for Reproductive Health partici-
pated in a conspiracy to overbill insurance companies and failed to
report nearly eight million dollars in partnership revenue to UCI.'67
Because Asch and Balmaceda have fled and are not available to
testify, their level of intent and culpability concerning their patients'
misappropriated eggs and embryos is unclear. 168  There is some
160. See, e.g., Compl., at 1, Clay v. Asch, (Orange County Super. Ct. filed
June 5, 1996) (No.752294); First Am. Compl. at 1, Ballou v. Asch, (Orange
County Super. Ct. filed June 5, 1996) (No.759238).
161. See Susan Kelleher, Fertility Doctor to Stand Trial Alone, ORANGE
COUNTY REG., Sept. 22, 1997, atB1.
162. See David Haldane, Firm Sues UCI Over Unclaimed Embryos, Sperm,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1997, at Al.
163. See John McDonald & Kim Christensen, No Jail: Fertility Doctor Gets
Home Detention, Fine, ORANGE COUNTY REG., May 12, 1998, at B2.
164. See Haldane, supra note 162, at Al.
165. See Orange County Perspective: UCI Scandal's Bottom Line, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 31, 1998, at B8 [hereinafter Orange County Perspective]. Doc-
tors Asch and Balmaceda were indicted on federal charges of mail fraud and
income tax evasion, but have not been tried. See Anderson & Schrader, supra
note 132, at Al.
166. McDonald & Christensen, supra note 163, at B2. Stone was sentenced
to a year of home detention where he must wear an electronic bracelet. See
Michelle Nicolosi, Indictment: Asch, Others Hid Incomes, ORANGE COUNTY
REG., June 21, 1997, at 2. He was also fined $50,000. See Susan Kelleher,
UCIAccused of Blocking Justice, ORANGE COUNTY REG., June 3, 1998, at B2.
167. See Davan Maharaj, Fertility Doctor Told of Conspiracy in Talks, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 1997, atB1.
168. Professor Robertson has theorized that a switch of embryos or gametes
is usually due to human error such as mislabeling, but notes that the material
could also be deliberately stolen. See John A. Robertson, The Case of the
Switched Embryos, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Nov. 21, 1995, at 13, [hereinafter
Robertson, Switched Embryos].
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suggestion that their conduct was deliberate and done with a profit
motive, 169 but Asch said in an interview that the misuse of eggs and
embryos occurred because of sloppy record keeping that was not in
his control. 170 Therefore, although the term "theft" may accurately
describe their conduct, this article usually uses the broader term
"misappropriation," which means here an unauthorized taking, mis-
use of, or failure to return material belonging to others.
IV. APPLYING A RELATIONAL ANALYSIS TO THE TORT OF
CONVERSION FOR MISAPPROPRIATION OF EGGS AND EMBRYOS
A. Conversion
Statutory and regulatory schemes have been proposed to curb
abuses in the fertility industry.1 71 Such schemes, however, may not
provide for recovery by the aggrieved fertility patients. 7 2 Redress
for the harm through the tort system is an important means of both
recognizing the relational concerns and attempting to make the ag-
grieved patients whole. The tort of conversion, which is defined as
"the wrongful exercise of dominion over personal property of an-
other,"'173 seems a logical choice for the victim patients. Conversion
169. See Louise Kiernan, The Science of Fertility Gives Birth to Dilemma,
BUFFALO NEWS, July 23, 1995, at F7 (speculating that the doctors may have
transferred eggs from younger to older women to inflate the clinic's success
rate and thus reap financial gain); Marcida Dodson et al., Fertility Patients
Agree on Settlements, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1997, at A23 (quoting plaintiffs'
attorney Melanie Blum as stating that the records show the large number of
misappropriated eggs and embryos could not have been an accident).
170. See, e.g., Kim Christensen & Jim Mulvaney, Asch Blames All on Staff,
UCI, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Feb. 27, 1996, at Al (illustrating Asch's position
that he had little or no knowledge of the record keeping procedures for consent
forms).
171. See, e.g., Byers, supra note 43, at 265-66 (proposing regulation of the
fertility industry).
172. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 367(g) (West Supp. 1998) (providing for
criminal penalties but not establishing any new civil remedy for misappropria-
tion of eggs or embryos).
173. 5 B. E. WITKN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, TORTS § 610 (9th ed.
1988); see also BARLOW BURKE, PERSONAL PROPERTY IN A NUTSHELL 88
(1993) ("It [conversion] is the wrongful exercise of dominion or control over
personalty..."); Suarez-Negrete v. Trotta, 705 A.2d 215, 218 (Conn. App. Ct.
1998) (conversion is "an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of
ownership over goods belonging to another, to the exclusion of the owner's
402
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is the closest civil counterpart to criminal theft, 174 and recognizing
that a theft, or something akin to a theft, 175 has occurred accords ap-
propriate weight to the doctors' wrongful conduct and the violation
of the victims.
The claim could be applied to the misappropriation of eggs or
embryos on the theory that the health care providers are bailees; that
is, that they have custody of the reproductive material in trust for the
patients, with the obligation to observe the express and implied terms
of the bailment and to return the bailed material when asked.' 76 In
York v. Jones,117 which involved custody of frozen embryos, the
court viewed the custodian as a bailee.178 This theory could be ap-
plied to eggs and embryos taken in fertility treatment, which are
given to a custodian with the assumption that they will be kept for
the donor couple. Failure to return the bailed material, or other mis-
use of it, would amount to a conversion.
179
However, the largest group of current misappropriation cases,
the Irvine fertility cases, are pending in California, where the
Moore 180 case raises issues about the applicability of conversion.
1. The Moore case
Moore concerned misappropriation of human tissue.18' Moore,
suffering from leukemia, had his spleen removed at the Medical
Center of the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA).1
8 2
Unknown to Moore and without any payment to him, his physician
rights.")
174. See James Lindgren, Why the Ancients May Not Have Needed a System
of Criminal Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 29, 36 (1996) (stating that "the crime of theft
corresponds to the tort of conversion").
175. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
176. See Roy Hardiman, Comment, Toward the Right of Commerciality:
Recognizing Property Rights in the Commercial Value of Human Tissue, 34
UCLA L. REv. 207, 244-48 (1986) (discussing bailment theory as applied to
human tissue).
177. 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
178. See id. at 425. For a discussion of the York case, see supra notes 74-80
and accompanying text
179. See Hardiman, supra note 28, at 248-50.
180. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 793 P.2d 479,
271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990).
181. See id. at 127, 793 P.2d at 481-82, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
182. See id. at 126, 793 P.2d at 481, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
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working in cooperation with drug companies used cells from his ex-
cised spleen to develop a cell line with a potential $3.01 billion dol-
lar market. 183 Moore sued various parties, including the Regents of
the University of California and his surgeon, who established the cell
line, alleging various theories, including conversion. 184 Moore al-
leged that doctors and drug companies made large profits because of
his spleen cells, and failed to acknowledge that he deserved any
compensation or had any interest in the cells. 185 His outrage was ex-
acerbated by his physicians' insistence that he make repeated trips to
UCLA from his home in Seattle so doctors could collect blood and
other samples. 186  These were ostensibly collected to monitor
Moore's health, but he alleged that the doctors actually collected
them so they could benefit financially from their continued access to
his cells.
187
The trial court granted demurrers to most of the claims, includ-
ing the conversion claim, and Moore appealed.18 8 The California
Court of Appeal reversed, holding that Moore had stated a cause of
action for conversion. 189 The California Supreme Court again re-
versed, holding in a strongly debated opinion that Moore could not
bring a conversion claim on these facts, although the court allowed
claims for breach of fiduciary duty and lack of informed consent.19
0
Moore, in some respects, appears analogous to the Irvine fertil-
ity cases. However, it is not necessary for courts to disregard or
overrule Moore in order to hold that misappropriation of human eggs
and embryos will support a conversion claim. The Moore court re-
stricted its holding when it stated that "we do not purport to hold that
excised cells can never be property for any purpose whatsoever,"
tying the holding to a policy favoring medical research. 191 That
183. See id. at 127, 793 P.2d at 482, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
184. See id. at 128 & n.4, 793 P.2d at 482 & n.4, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 149 & n.4.
185. See id. at 132-33, 793 P.2d at 485-86, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 152-53.
186. See id. at 126, 793 P.2d at 481, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 128, 793 P.2d at 482-83, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 149-50.
189. See id. at 128, 793 P.2d at 483, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
190. See id. at 128-29, 136, 144, 793 P.2d at 483, 488, 494, 271 Cal. Rptr. at
150, 155, 161. The adequacy of the other claims is discussed infra at notes
336-45 and accompanying text.
191. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 142, 793 P.2d at 493, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 160. Some
research may have been done on the UCI patients' eggs and embryos, but this
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policy, whatever its advisability on the Moore facts, should not apply
to human eggs and embryos, which are taken in fertility treatment
not for research purposes, but to produce human babies. There is no
reason for society to encourage this misappropriation. On the con-
trary, concern for human flourishing means that society should label
such conduct repugnant and actively discourage it.
192
An overarching criticism of the Moore decision rests on its fail-
ure to sufficiently weigh personal considerations. 193 In his dissent,
Justice Mosk eloquently invoked concerns of human dignity and
fundamental fairness as outweighing any concerns over increased
litigation raised by allowing the conversion claim. 9 4 Concurring and
dissenting, Justice Broussard castigated the court's inconsistency in
what he saw as allowing an exception to conversion liability, thus
foreclosing an important avenue of recovery to the plaintiff, but per-
miring the doctors and drug companies to retain their "ill-gotten
gains free of their ordinary common law liability."' 95 Indeed, some
commentators have faulted the court as engaging in unsound legal
analysis in order to protect the research industry. 96 These concerns
was done without their permission. See McCarthy, supra note 147, at Al.
Policy should not favor this conduct.
192. See supra notes 14-30 and accompanying text.
193. Several commentators have criticized the court for failing to include
relational concerns in its policy considerations. See, e.g., Laura M. Ivey,
Comment, Moore v. Regents of the University of California: Insufficient Pro-
tection of Patients'Rights in the Biotechnological Market, 25 GA. L. REv. 489,
512 (1991) (arguing that the Moore court failed to accord sufficient weight to
patients' rights); James P. Leeds, Note, Moore v. Regents of the University of
California: More for Biotechnology, Less for Patients, 25 IND. L. REV. 559,
587 (1991) (arguing that the Moore decision was "a victory for biotechnology"
that insufficiently protects patients' rights); Danielle M. Wagner, Comment,
Property Rights in the Human Body: The Commercialization of Organ Trans-
plantation and Biotechnology, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 931, 942 (1995) (agreeing
with Mosk's argument that the Moore majority deviated from fundamental
fairness in allowing the defendants' unjust enrichment at Moore's expense).
194. See 51 Cal. 3d at 173-74, 793 P.2d at 515-16, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 182-83
(Mosk, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 160, 793 P.2d at 506, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 173 (Broussard, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
196. See, e.g., Ivey, supra note 193, at 507, 519 (stating that "[t]he opinion
... failed to convincingly justify its rejection of Moore's conversion cause of
action" and "attributed inordinate importance to protecting the research indus-
try"); Leeds, supra note 193, at 587 (describing the opinion as "a victory for
the biotechnology industry"); Lisa Mundrake, Note, Biotechnology and Moore
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over relational issues, important as they should have been in Moore,
are much more important with respect to human eggs and embryos,
because they are of such intimate importance to their progenitors.
Each of the specific bases for the court's holding has been co-
gently criticized and should not apply to misappropriation of eggs
and embryos.
(1) The court said that Moore had abandoned his spleen cells
and therefore had no ownership interest in them.197 This is the most
convincing basis for the holding, although it has been criticized. 198
However, it has no application to misappropriation of eggs and em-
bryos. Moore had no further use for the excised cells. Eggs and em-
bryos, on the other hand, are more like the stored sperm in Hecht,
where the court acknowledged that a donor to a sperm bank does not
abandon his sperm. 199 Similarly, the UCI patients' eggs and em-
bryos, far from being abandoned, were precious to their progenitors,
who parted with possession only temporarily and expected to retain
control over them.
20 0
v. Regents of the University of California: The Revolution of the Future, 13
WHITIER L. REv. 1009, 1042 (1992) (stating that the court appeared to be"searching for any argument which would prevent the extension of tort liabil-
ity, for the sole purpose of protecting the medical research industry"); but see
Anthony R. LoBiondo, Patient Autonomy and Biomedical Research: Judicial
Compromise in Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 1 ALB. L.J.
SCI. & TECH. 277, 299 (1991) (stating that "[t]he California Supreme Court's
decision not to extend the law of conversion to encompass a patient's owner-
ship right to excised tissue is a prudent exercise in judicial restraint").
197. See Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 136-37, 793 P.2d at 488-89, 271 Cal. Rptr. at
155-56.
198. See Philippe Ducor, The Legal Status of Human Materials, 44 DRAKE
L. REv. 195, 252-53 (1996).
199. See Hecht v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 846 n.4, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 275, 280-81 n.4 (1993).
200. See Plaintiffs [Challenders'] Memorandum of Points and Authorities to
Demurrers to Complaint of Defendant Regents of the University of Cal. at 8,
Challender v. Regents, (Orange County Super. Ct. filed Nov. 9, 1995) (No.
748303) (arguing that they "placed great value on their eggs, sperm, and em-
bryos," which "were to be removed temporarily in order to achieve fertilization
through 'assisted' means and then returned or preserved"); Plaintiffs [Clays']
Opposition to the Demurrer of Defendant, The Regents of the University of
Cal.; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 7, Clay v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 752294 (Orange County Super. Ct. filed Nov.
9, 1995) (arguing that rather than abandoning their reproductive materials, the
plaintiffs retained dominion and control over them and expected they would be
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(2) The court determined that Moore's tissue was not property
and therefore could not be converted.2 °1 This holding was based on
the idea that existing legislation so drastically limited Moore's rights
in his tissue that it could not be characterized as property.2 0 2 How-
ever, the cited legislation is more limited in scope,20 3 prescribing
only how to dispose of body parts used for research.20 4 Therefore, it
should not be an obstacle to claims for conversion of eggs or em-
bryos.
The court's holding that Moore's cells were not property has
been questioned by commentators who believe it is flatly wrong,
20 5
some seeing irony in the court's denial of Moore's property right
while affirming the doctor's.20 6 A federal district court has reached a
contrary result, holding that a cell line is a chattel capable of being
converted.20 7 Furthermore, the Hecht court has distinguished Moore
to hold that there is a property interest in human sperm,208 material
that is more analogous to eggs and embryos than a spleen.
used only by them or would be destroyed).
201. See Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 140-41, 793 P.2d at 491, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
202. See id.
203. See id. at 140, 793 P.2d at 492, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 159 (citing CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7054.4 (West Supp. 1997), which prescribes the
method of disposal of body parts and tissues after "scientific use").
204. See Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 156, 793 P.2d at 503, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 170
(Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting). See also Ivey, supra note 193, at
515 (finding the majority's "imprecise interpretation" of the statutes to be "ex-
tremely suspect").
205. See Jeffrey A. Potts, Note, Moore v. Regents of the University of Cali-
fornia: Expanded Disclosure, Limited Property Rights, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 453,
488 (stating that Moore's cells were property under California law and there-
fore would support a conversion claim); Robertson, Switched Embyros, supra
note 168, at 17 (stating that misappropriation of gametes and embryos could be
characterized as "conversion of property").
206. See Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 160, 793 P.2d at 506, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 173
(Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting); Catherine Caturano Horan, Your
Spleen Is Not Worth What It Used to Be: Moore v. Regents of UCLA [sic], 24
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1423, 1444 (1991); Wagner, supra note 193, at 942.
207. See United States v. Arora, 860 F. Supp. 1091, 1099 (D. Md. 1994),
affd, 56 F.3d 62 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding researcher's destruction of new re-
search cell line was conversion). The court cited Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (holding interest in genetically engineered organism
was ownership interest under patent laws) and Institut Pasteur v. United States,
814 F.2d 624, 626 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (assuming donated cell line was property).
208. See Hecht, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 281, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 281-82.
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(3) The court also cited the lack of any cases allowing such a
conversion claim. 20 9 However, dissenting Justice Broussard retorted
that there were also no reported decisions rejecting such a claim,
210
saying that this was "simply a case of first impression." 211 Justice
Mosk agreed, pointing out that the issue had not been previously de-
cided because the technology was new.212  Similarly, the lack of
cases explicitly allowing a conversion claim for eggs or embryos
should not cause courts to shrink from allowing the claim in a factual
situation arising from new technology.
(4) The court said that traditional conversion principles could
not be applied to the facts of Moore.213 However, Justice Broussard
stated, "In reality, it is the majority opinion that departs from estab-
lished common law principles by fashioning a novel exception that
shields the defendants in this case from the ordinary reach of conver-
sion liability. '214 Several commentators agree that under traditional
analysis, a conversion claim for misappropriation of human repro-
ductive material should be allowed.215
(5) The court said that if conversion were to be extended, the
legislature and not the courts should do so.2 16 Justice Mosk found
this reasoning "[s]urely... out of place in an opinion of the highest
court of this state," citing some of the California Supreme Court's
ground-breaking decisions in the field of tort law.217
209. See Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 135, 793 P.2d at 487, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
210. See id. at 165, 793 P.2d at 502, 271 Cal. Rptr. 169 (Broussard, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
211. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
212. See id. at 161, 793 P.2d at 507, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 171 (Mosk, J., dis-
senting). See also Wagner, supra note 193, at 942 (criticizing Moore as moti-
vated by "blind adherence to tradition" and stating that "[t]he courts should not
refrain from recognizing a right simply because such a right was not tradition-
ally recognized").
213. See Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 140-41, 793 P.2d at 492, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
214. Id. at 157 n.4, 793 P.2d at 503-04 n.4, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 170-71 n.4
(Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
215. See Daar, supra note 125, at 657 (mentioning conversion as a "perfectly
appropriate tool for gaining legal relief against physician abuse of fertility pa-
tients"); Robertson, Switched Embryos, supra note 168, at 17 (stating that con-
version is an appropriate claim for misappropriation of gametes or embryos).
216. See Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 147, 793 P.2d at 496, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 163.
217. Id. at 161, 793 P.2d at 507, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 171 (Mosk, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
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(6) The court said that a conversion claim was not needed in
Moore because there are other claims that can vindicate the plain-
tiff's rights.218 But these other claims may be illusory, as is devel-
oped below,2 19 and their existence is not a convincing reason to pre-
clude a conversion claim.
Because of the differing policy considerations, the court's limi-
tation of Moore to its facts, and the inapplicability of some of the
other bases of the Moore holding the case should not preclude appli-
cation of conversion theory where reproductive material is con-
cemed.
2. The required state of mind for conversion
Prosser and Keeton have described conversion as "a fascinating
tort... [h]ighly technical in its rules and complications .... ,22 0 One
unusual feature of this "intentional" tort221 is that the required intent
is not the conscious wrongdoing that one usually associates with in-
tentional acts.222 Rather, it is simply the intent "to exercise a do-
minion or control over the goods which is in fact inconsistent with
the plaintiffs rights." 223 Thus, a third party to the original misap-
propriation, such as a buyer of stolen goods, is a converter, even
though she buys them in good faith.224 Accordingly, conversion is
sometimes called a "strict liability tort," a position taken by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in Moore.225 In using this as a reason for de-
nying a conversion claim, the court's real concern was to avoid im-
posing unwarranted liability on innocent third parties such as
researchers who receive cells from the original physician, and who
would thus be discouraged from conducting medical research.226
However, it is possible to adequately protect innocent third parties
218. See id. at 147, 793 P.2d at 496-97, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 163-64.
219. See infra notes 336-45 and accompanying text.
220. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 15, at 88 (5th ed. 1984).
221. See, e.g., Dickerson v. Young, 332 N.W.2d 93, 98 (Iowa 1983) (classi-
fying conversion as an intentional tort).
222. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 220 § 15, at 92.
223. Id.
224. See id. at 92-93.
225. Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 144, 793 P.2d at 494, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
226. See id.
January 1999]
LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW [Vol. 32:381
through the doctrine of accession and through accepted damages
principles, 227 while still allowing for liability of the true wrongdoers
where other claims may be more difficult to establish.
228
3. The characterization of eggs and embryos
Because conversion is defined as dominion over property, the
question of whether eggs and embryos are property must be ad-
dressed. This question is not easily answered. Courts and commen-
tators have struggled with the characterization of human body parts
and products.229 Nor does the decision to take a relational view re-
solve the issue, for there has been continuing debate about whether
calling human body products "property" affirms or discourages hu-
man flourishing.230
Simply put, property is whatever the law says it is. As the
United States Supreme Court has observed, "[N]ot all economic in-
terests are 'property rights'; only those economic advantages are
'rights' which have the law back of them .... 231 The legal analysis
conceptualizes property as a bundle of rights inherent in a person's
relation to a physical thing.232 The bundle includes rights to "pos-
sess, use, exclude others, enjoy the fruits and profits, destroy, and
alienate." 233  But not all of these rights are necessary for full
227. See infra notes 290-335 and accompanying text.
228. See infra notes 336-45 and accompanying text.
229. For thorough discussions of the historical treatment and current char-
acterizations of human body parts and products, see William Boulier, Note,
Sperm, Spleens, and Other Valuables: The Need to Recognize Property Rights
in Human Body Parts, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 693, 731 (1995) (reviewing his-
torical and current developments, and urging adoption of "a full property right
in the human body"); Bray, supra note 17, at 210 (reviewing historical and cur-
rent developments in categorizing body parts and urging adoption of a quasi-
property approach). An earlier but creative and influential treatment of the
subject appears in Andrews, My Body, My Property, HAST. CTR. RPT., Oct.
1996, at 28, 37 [hereinafter Andrews, My Body, My Property] (calling for rec-
ognition of a limited property right in body parts and products).
230. See RADiN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 15, at 125-26.
231. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945).
232. See Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 165, 793 P.2d at 509, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 176
(Mosk., J., dissenting); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,
831 (1987). For a fuller discussion of the bundle of rights concept, see J.E.
Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711
(1996).
233. Shelby D. Green, The Public Housing Tenancy. Variations on the
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ownership.234 Thus, "some types of properties can be given, but not
sold (items made of fur or feathers of endangered species, for exam-
ple). Other types of properties (such as holdings of a person who is
bankrupt) can be sold, but not given as gifts., 235 The question, then,
is how our society should view body parts and products.
While it is unlikely that anyone would argue that eggs are per-
sons,236 some have vehemently maintained that embryos are.
237
Characterizing human embryos as "persons" would seem to reinforce
relational concerns, but students of the issue have found the problem
more complex than that. Our jurisprudence has not treated embryos
as persons.238 The Supreme Court has held that "the word 'person,'
as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the un-
born." 239 Nor are they persons in other contexts such as homicide
and wrongful death.240 If we did characterize embryos as persons,
they would acquire rights that we have historically been unwilling to
accord them. For example, health care professionals could not
Common Law that Give Security of Tenure and Control, 43 CATH. U. L. REV.
681,716-17 (1994).
234. See United States v. Ben-Hur, 20 F.3d 313, 317-18 (7th Cir. 1994); see
also James D. Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens,
Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413, 1512 (stating "The re-
moval of one or more sticks from the bundle should have no particular impli-
cations for the legally protected interests that remain").
235. Andrews, My Body, My Property, supra note 229, at 29.
236. See Anne Reichman Schiff, Arising from the Dead: Challenges of Post-
humous Procreation, 75 N.C. L. REV. 901, 920 (1997) (stating that "only the
most extreme view would characterize sperm or unfertilized eggs as 'per-
sons"') (citing PETER SINGER & DEANE WELLS, MAKING BABIEs: THE NEW
SCIENCE AND ETHICS OF CONCEPTION 71 (1985)).
237. See id. at 918 (observing that there is controversy about the status of the
embryo, but that 'the embryo as person' view is not a position that is reflected
either in American common law or current constitutional law").
238. See id. (treating gametes as property); see generally Michelle F. Sub-
lett, Note, Frozen Embryos: What Are They and How Should the Law Treat
Them?, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 585, 600-08 (1990) (reviewing law on status of
embryos). But see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:123 (West 1991) (providing that
in vitro fertilized ovum is a biological human being).
239. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) (establishing a constitutional
right to choose an abortion).
240. See Sublett, supra note 238, at 589-90 (noting that the death of a fetus
will not support a wrongful death claim or homicide prosecution); see also
Schiff, supra note 236, at 918 (mentioning constitutional, homicide, and
wrongful death law as areas in which embryos are not treated as persons).
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dispose of them without legally committing murder; disputes over
embryos would be governed by the "best interest of the child"
rule; 241 and embryos would have all the rights of persons, including
the right to sue.242 Thus, this characterization has not received strong
support among the commentators who advocate a relational view of
the issue,2 43 and it is ultimately unsatisfactory.
This raises the question whether human eggs and embryos
should be classified as property. Interestingly, while the sale of hu-
man eggs and embryos is illegal in many foreign countries, 244 only a
few United States jurisdictions have taken the same approach. 245 So-
ciety currently recognizes property rights in certain body products:
for example, blood, sperm, ova,2 46 cells, and hair are alienable.
247
241. See infra note 286 and accompanying text.
242. See Schiff, supra note 236, at 917.
243. See infra note 267 and accompanying text.
244. See, e.g., Japanese Couple to Donate Fertilized Eggs to U.S. Couple,
JAPAN SCI. SCAN, Jan. 19, 1998, available in 1998 WL 8029751 (donating
eggs and embryos is illegal in Japan); Gina Kolata, U.S. Fertility Centers At-
tract Eager Foreigners, TIMES-UNION, Jan. 4, 1998, at A5, available in 1998
WL 7239066 (making payments to egg donors is illegal in Australia and Eng-
land).
245. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 873.05 (West 1994) (advertising or sale of hu-
man eggs is illegal in Florida); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:122 (West 1991)
(sale of a human ovum, fertilized human ovum, or human embryo is illegal).
246. See Ann Alpers & Bernard Lo, Commodification and Commercializa-
tion in Human Embryo Research, 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 39, 41 (1995)
(stating that payment for sperm and eggs is now "widespread in American
clinical infertility programs"). But see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:122 (West
1991) (sale of ova and embryos is prohibited).
247. See Boulier, supra note 229, at 712 (citing RUSSELL SCOTT, THE BODY
AS PROPERTY 180-81, 190-91 (1981)). Boulier notes that blood, semen, hair,
teeth, sweat, urine, skin, muscle, and even pituitary glands have been "treated
as commodities appropriate for sale with very little legal involvement." Id.
Boulier also notes that the current statutory schemes leave many issues unad-
dressed. See id. at 712-13.
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, now passed "in some form, by all fifty
states," authorizes donations of body parts for medical research, while the Na-
tional Organ Transplantation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201, 273, 274(e) (Supp. 1994),
prohibits the sale of organs for transplant, but is silent on dispositions of or-
gans for other purposes. See Boulier, supra note 223, at 712-13. Boulier also
explains that most states have laws similarly limited in scope, while only a few
have passed more detailed schemes. See id. at 713 nn.145-46. See also Schiff,
supra note 236, at 916 (citing Gloria J. Banks, Legal and Ethical Safeguards:
Protection of Society's Most Vulnerable Participants in a Commercialized Or-
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Although those who provide eggs are often referred to as "donors,"
and their payment described as payment for services, not goods,
248
the transfer of money for human eggs 249 and, to a lesser extent, em-
bryos250 is occurring on a widespread basis in the United States.
Some commentators have therefore suggested that they should be
characterized in the law as property.251 Professor Robertson has
made the related point that, "[s]ince eggs and embryos would appear
to be things of value, there is no barrier in principle to applying theft
and larceny laws to their misappropriation.
252
At the same time, many legal commentators have been reluctant
to unequivocally classify human eggs and embryos as "property."
253
Indeed, we ought to question whether complete commodification of
eggs and embryos is appropriate, since they involve the most
gan Transplantation System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 45, 65-66 (1995)).
248. See, e.g., Byers, supra note 46, at 275 n.69; Katheryn D. Katz, Ghost
Mothers: Human Egg Donation and the Legacy of the Past, 57 ALB. L. REV.
733, 739 (1994) (stating that egg providers are not donors, but "are paid $2000
for their 'time and effort"').
249. See Marie McCullough, Egg Donor's Role in Baby-Making Grows,
TIMES-UNION, Mar. 9, 1998 at Al, available in 1998 WL 7248102 (eggs are
now bought and sold on the open market); Knox, supra note 68, at 1 (egg bro-
ker advertises $35,000 plus expenses for egg of Princeton University student).
250. See Terry Anderson, Too Much Technology is a Bad Thing, BUFF.
NEWS, Nov. 26, 1997, at B3, available in 1997 WL 6476716 (discussing the
emerging business in embryos from surplus eggs fertilized through commercial
sperm banks).
251. See, e.g., Barry Brown, Reconciling Property Law with Advances in
Reproductive Science, 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 73, 76 (1995) (noting that the
Supreme Court of Tennessee treated human preembryos as though they were
property of the couple). See also Boulier, supra note 229, at 731 (advocating a
"full property right in the human body").
252. John A. Robertson, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Family,
47 HASTINGS L.J. 911, 919 (1996).
253. See, e.g., Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 20, at 1856 n.33
(noting that status of sperm, eggs, and embryos is subject of debate); Katheleen
R. Guzman, Property, Progeny, Body Part: Assisted Reproduction and the
Transfer of Wealth, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 193, 207 (1997) (suggesting that
traditional categories of person and property may not be useful to analyze
problems concerning reproductive material). Cf Andrews, My Body, My
Property, supra note 85, at 29 (suggesting that human body parts might be
classified as quasi-property that would not be treatable as property by third
parties); Hardiman, supra note 176, at 258 (proposing that instead of an abso-
lute property right the law should recognize a "right of commerciality" in hu-
man tissue).
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personal of concerns. Their retrieval involves a more invasive and
risky process than does retrieval of either blood, semen, or hair.
25 4
Furthermore, the potential of embryos to become human beings
makes them more personal and valuable to the donors than blood or
hair.
Moreover, they are undeniably a form of life, and our past
should caution us about referring to life as property. Two of the least
savory aspects of our cultural history are the treatment of slaves
255
and women256 as property. This history illustrates how complete al-
ienability can adversely affect peoples' well-being. Yet ownership in
the context of slavery, where one human being owns another, is sig-
nificantly different from the ownership rights in one's own body.
257
The right of alienability and control over one's own regenerative
body products affirms personhood and offers psychological benefits,
including a salutary sense of autonomy.258 Therefore, the moral ar-
guments against slavery actually favor recognition of a property right
in human tissue.259 Recognizing a property right in human eggs and
embryos may thus be appropriate to advance people's well-being.
254. See Katz, supra note 248, at 772 (stating "[T]he retrieval of eggs is
more complex and requires more sophisticated techniques than the collection
of sperm").
255. See United States v. The Libellants & Claimants of the Schooner
Amistad, 40 U.S. 518, 593, 597 (1841) (holding that rebellious Africans were
not property but had been kidnapped and were therefore entitled to their free-
dom); KATHARINE T. BARTLETT & ANGELA P. HARRIS, GENDER AND LAW;
THEORY DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 8 (2d ed. 1998) (reviewing the history of
slaves as property of their masters).
256. See BARTLETT & HARRIS, supra note 255, at 9-16 (reviewing the legal
history of married women as property of their husbands).
257. See Karen G. Biagi, Note, Moore v. Regents of the University of Cali-
fornia: Patients, Property Rights, and Public Policy, 35 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 433,
433 (1991).
258. See Andrews, My Body, My Property, supra note 229, at 37; but see
Stephen R. Munzer, An Uneasy Case Against Property Rights in Body Parts, in
PROPERTY RIGHTS 259 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1994) (arguing on rela-
tional grounds against a property right in human bodies and body products).
259. See Hardiman, supra note 176, at 225; see also John A. Robertson, In
the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. REV. 437, 512
(1990) (observing that, although treatment of human embryos as sellable prop-
erty may be offensive as "smack[ing] too much of the buying and selling of
human beings that occurred in chattel slavery," the purchased embryos differ
from slaves in that they would not be the slaves of their "owners").
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However, at least one court and some commentators who ac-
knowledge the need for recognition of a property right believe that it
should be limited.260 The common law already includes a way to
recognize a limited property right: the category of "quasi-
property."261 Restricted to certain narrow situations, this category
finds its most widespread use in assuring the rights of next-of-kin to
determine how a corpse will be disposed of.262  The majority of
United States jurisdictions recognize this right,263 which commonly
includes "the right to custody of the body; to receive it in the condi-
tion in which it was left, without mutilation; to have the body treated
with decent respect, without outrage or indignity thereto; and to bury
or otherwise dispose of the body without interference. ' 264 Quasi-
property rights have also been recognized in trademarks265 and in a
stillborn fetus on behalf of its mother who objected to introduction of
evidence found during its autopsy.
266
The common law classification of these items as quasi-property
occurred where courts had to deal with rights that did not fit neatly
into traditional classifications but which they felt clearly deserved
protection. The quasi-property category is therefore a reasonable
choice for eggs and embryos, 267 which also do not fit neatly into
260. See infra note 267 and accompanying text.
261. See 22A AM. JUR. 2D Dead Bodies § 3 (1988); Hardiman, supra note
176, at 217 n.44.
262. See 22A AM. JUR. 2D Dead Bodies § 3.
263. See Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 480 (6th Cir. 1991).
264. Whitehair v. Highland Memory Gardens, Inc., 327 S.E.2d 438, 441 (W.
Va. 1985) (citations omitted).
265. See, e.g., Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v.
Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 955 F. Supp. 605, 613 n.7 (E.D. Va. 1997) (recog-
nizing "an owner's quasi-property right in a famous mark"); LeBas Fashion
Imports of USA, Inc. v. ITT Hartford Ins. Group, 50 Cal. App. 4th 548, 561,
59 Cal. Rptr. 36, 50 (1996) (stating that common law misappropriation creates
quasi-property right in a "word or style").
266. See Jackson v. State, 430 S.E.2d 781, 784 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
267. The Davis court held that embryos occupy an intermediate category.
See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text. Several commentators have
reasoned similarly. See Andrews, Legal Status of the Embryo, supra note 29,
at 368 (stating that an embryo is "neither person nor property"); Bray, supra
note 17, at 239-40 (arguing that "individuals' interests in their bodies should be
protected as property interests" that are nonetheless market inalienable); Guz-
man, supra note 253, at 251-52 (concluding that we must recognize some
property rights in frozen embryos, but that previous "safe and easy" distinc-
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traditional categories, and which involve interests that deserve pro-
tection. 68 Precisely because eggs and embryos are so personal and
important,269 they should be placed in a category that assures their
donors some property rights.270  Characterizing them as quasi-
property would allow for vesting of rights similar to those already
recognized in other quasi-property,27 1 securing for donors the rights
to custody of the material, to receive it in the condition in which it
was left, and to determine its ultimate disposition.2 7 2 The right to ex-
clude others, which is recognized as "one of the most essential sticks
tions will not apply); John A. Robertson, Posthumous Reproduction, 69 IND.
L.J. 1027, 1038 (1994) (stating that regardless of whether a conversion action
will lie under Moore, "a property interest in gametes must exist"); Schiff, su-
pra note 236, at 921 (advocating classification of embryos in an intermediate
category between persons and property); Helene S. Shapo, Matters of Life and
Death: Inheritance Consequences of Reproductive Technologies, 25 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1091, 1145 (1997) (stating that most courts and commentators have
favored placing preembryos in an intermediate category between property and
personhood). But see Richard Gold, Owning Our Bodies: An Examination of
Property Law and Biotechnology, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1167, 1170-72
(1995) (arguing that the human body should not be subject to property analy-
sis); Munzer, supra note 258, at 259 (arguing on relational grounds against a
property right in human bodies and body products).
268. See James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright,
Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413, 1513-14
(1992) (arguing that the problem should be addressed by first identifying the
goals at stake and then determining what remedy will adequately achieve
them).
269. See Andrews, My Body, My Property, supra note 229, at 31 (stating that
characterizing gametes and embryos as property is appropriate to accord
weight to the biological parents' wishes).
270. See id. at 30 (stating that "if body parts are not considered property,
there may be little protection for people who entrust their bodily materials to
others").
271. See id. at 29, 37 (mentioning quasi-property theory and advocating that
body parts be placed in an intermediate category under which regenerative
body parts would be saleable by the individual but not by third parties); see
also Hardiman, supra note 176, at 250 (arguing that a quasi-property right ex-
ists in excised tissue and will support a conversion claim); Horan, supra note
206, at 1445 (suggesting that quasi-property rights would be appropriately ap-
plied to human tissue).
272. See Brown, supra note 251, at 84 (stating that "application of property
theory regarding the traditional bundle of rights associated with ownership will
enhance the coming public policy debate" concerning ownership of genetic
material).
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in the bundle of... property,"273 would survive under this approach.
It accords with the Ethical Statement of the American Fertility Soci-
ety, which provides that the donors of gametic material should have
the right to control its disposition within the law.274
This intermediate treatment could be tailored to forestall an evil
pointed out by Professor Andrews: allowing third persons to sell an
individual's body products.275 Complete alienability might encour-
age the poor to sell body parts to pay bills or taxes, encourage per-
sons to sell their family members' body parts, and subject body parts
to tax or physicians' liens.276 Therefore, the better proposal is that
persons should be allowed dominion over their own body products
and regenerative parts, but others should not be allowed to treat them
as alienable.
2 77
An intermediate categorization of body products and regenera-
tive parts as property of the individual would support an action for
conversion. The plaintiff need not have "absolute ownership" to
maintain a conversion action.278 A qualified interest in property,
such as possession of a lien, is sufficient.279 Thus, if society desires
some qualification of the progenitors' rights, 28 0 that can be accom-
plished without depriving the plaintiff of a conversion claim.
4. Conversion remedies-application to eggs and embryos
Even if the obstacles to identifying a sufficient property interest
in eggs and embryos are overcome, there remains another obstacle to
273. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982)).
274. See AFS Ethical Statement, supra note 80, at 89S.
275. See Andrews, My Body, My Property, supra note 229, at 36.
276. See id.; see also Boulier, supra note 229, at 728 (noting the dangers of
persons "selling off... 'loved ones' to make a fast dollar").
277. See Andrews, My Body, My Property, supra note 229, at 37. Cf
Brown, supra note 251, at 80 (proposing that "remote gestation," with its pos-
sibility of "cryogenic orphans," should be banned).
278. See Leeds, supra note 193, at 582 (citing Everfresh, Inc. v. Goodman,
131 Cal. App. 2d 818, 820, 281 P.2d 560, 561 (1955)).
279. See id. (citing Bastanchury v. Times-Mirror Co., 68 Cal. App. 2d 217,
156 P.2d 488 (1945) and Ruiz v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 135
Cal. App. 2d Supp. 860, 287 P.2d 409 (1955) which states that a "qualified in-
terest" in an automobile is sufficient).
280. See Byers, supra note 43, at 303.
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applying the conversion tort. The traditional remedies for conversion
are replevin and damages, 281 each of which is problematic in this
context.
a. replevin
Replevin judicially returns the misappropriated property to the
plaintiff.282  While such a remedy makes sense with chattels like
diamond rings or automobiles, it is unsuitable where human eggs and
embryos are concerned. In the typical case, the plaintiff is suing be-
cause her egg or embryo was implanted in another woman. The pro-
cedure may have failed, meaning the material no longer exists, or it
may have resulted in a live birth.283 In that event, traditional conver-
sion doctrine dictates that the gestational parent is a converter.
284
This remedy, then, would replevy a living child, greatly different
from the misappropriated reproductive material. Such a result would
be unsatisfying for any number of reasons, one of which is a repug-
nance toward treating human beings as property.285 A second reason
is the now generally accepted principle that the best interests of the
child should apply in child custody cases.286 It is widely believed
that taking a child from the only parents she has known and placing
her with persons who are strangers to her can be psychologically
harmful.2 87  Moreover, the doctrine of accession would limit
281. See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES § 5.13(1), at 835, §
5.17(1), at 917 (2d ed. 1993).
282. See id. § 5.17(1), at 917.
283. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
284. See Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 144, 793 P.2d at 494, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
285. See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
286. See Raven C. Lidman & Betsy R. Hollingsworth, The Guardian Ad Li-
tem in Child Custody Cases: The Contours of Our Judicial System Stretched
Beyond Recognition, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 255, 275 (1998); Sublett, supra
note 238, at 604 (commenting that courts "most frequently adopt the doctrine
of the 'best interests of the child' in custody cases").
287. See Katz, supra note 248, at 757 & nn. 112-14 and accompanying text
(emphasizing importance of child's attachments to adults who may not be part
of the nuclear family). Psychologists warn against the potential psychological
harm to a child if she is taken from the only parents she has ever lived with.
See David Parrish & Kim Christensen, UCI Cases May Spawn Custody Wars,
ORANGE COUNTY REG., July 9, 1995, at Al (quoting psychologist Frances
Latimore).
288. See infra notes 327-32 and accompanying text.
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application of this remedy where the material has undergone a sig-
nificant change. Consequently, this traditional conversion remedy
will serve to promote neither practical nor relational concerns where
human eggs and embryos are concerned.289
b. damages
Even where replevin is inappropriate, conversion principles pro-
vide for money damages. The traditional measure of damages for
conversion is the market value of the property at the time and place
of conversion, plus, if appropriate, interest and costs incurred in re-
covering the property.29  Here a conceptual difficulty arises. Fixing
a market value for eggs or embryos is difficult as well as unsettling.
It is difficult because of the widely varying prices people offer for
them,291 and because eggs and embryos are often characterized as
"donated," with the donor simply being paid for her expenses.2 92 It
is unsettling because it suggests that these human materials are not
personal at all, but fungible.293
But market value is not the only permissible measure of dam-
ages for conversion. Notwithstanding the frequently repeated gen-
eral rule, many jurisdictions allow other measures where necessary to
avoid injustice.294 Depending on the circumstances, these may in-
lude such items as consequential damages,295 the cost of recreating
the converted property,296 or emotional distress damages.
297
289. See Hardiman, supra note 176, at 253-55 (observing that the traditional
rules for replevin are difficult to apply in the context of human tissue).
290. See id. at 251-52; see also I DOBBS, supra note 281 § 5.13(1), at 835.
291. See supra notes 248-49 and accompanying text.
292. However, whether their donation is called a sale or a service, it is possi-
ble to determine prices paid for eggs. See supra notes 248-49 and accompa-
nying text.
293. See supra notes 18-30 and accompanying text.
294. See, e.g., American E. India Corp. v. Ideal Shoe Co., 400 F. Supp. 141,
169 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (stating that the general purpose of conversion damages is
to provide indemnity for loss sustained, and whatever measure will accomplish
that end is appropriate).
295. See Grant v. Newsome, 411 S.E.2d 796, 798 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (stat-
ing that consequential damages would be recoverable in inmate's claim for
conversion of personal property); Staub v. Staub, 376 A.2d 1129, 1133 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (stating that consequential damages to compensate for
"other injurious consequences.., of the... conversion" may be allowed, but
denying them because of lack of proof); Southern Mo. Bank v. Fogle, 738
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In California, a statutory rule governs. Enacted in 1872, the
conversion statute has two alternative damages provisions: "The
value of the property at the time of the conversion, with the interest
from that time, or an amount sufficient to indemnify the party injured
for the loss which is the natural, reasonable and proximate result of
the wrongful act complained of and which a proper degree of pru-
dence on his part would not have averted., 298 The courts have de-
termined that the first measure, based on the value of the converted
property at the date of conversion, is the ordinary measure.299 How-
ever, courts apply the second measure when application of the first
would be manifestly unjust,300 allowing recovery in special circum-
stances for items such as lost profits
30 1 and emotional distress. 30 2
Various courts have held similarly in other jurisdictions.
30 3
S.W.2d 153, 158 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that lost profits during a reason-
able time for replacement of the chattel may be recoverable in a conversion
case, but denying them on the facts); Virgil T. Walker Constr. Co. v. Flores,
710 S.W.2d 159, 161 (Tex. App. 1986, no writ) (allowing recovery of cost of
shipping farm equipment that defendant converted before plaintiff could sell it
as the "natural and proximate result of the defendant's wrong").
296. See, e.g., United States v. Arora, 860 F. Supp. 1091, 1100 (D. Md.
1994) (allowing as damages the cost of creating or recreating converted human
cells).
297. See Gonzales v. Personal Storage, Inc., 56 Cal. App. 4th 464, 477, 65
Cal. Rptr. 2d 473, 481 (1997) (holding that emotional distress damages were
recoverable for conversion of personal property by storage company); Ducote
v. City of Alexandria, 677 So. 2d 1118, 1122 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (allowing
damages for mental anguish for conversion of truck); Morrow v. Kings Dept.
Stores, Inc., 290 S.E.2d 732, 735 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (stating that emotional
distress damages are recoverable in conversion claims where "malice, wanton-
ness, or other aggravating circumstances" are present); Fredeen v. Stride, 525
P.2d 166, 168 (Or. 1974) (stating that emotional distress damages for conver-
sion of dog may be awarded if the defendant's conduct was "aggravated").
298. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3336 (West 1991).
299. See Krueger v. Bank of America, 145 Cal. App. 3d 204, 215, 193 Cal.
Rptr. 322, 329 (1983) (awarding damages based on the value of converted
property at the date of conversion).
300. See Lint v. Chisholm, 121 Cal. App. 3d 615, 624-25, 177 Cal. Rptr.
314, 319 (1981) (awarding damages for loss of use because they exceeded the
interest measure).
301. See Myers v. Stephens, 233 Cal. App. 2d 104, 117-19, 43 Cal. Rptr.
420, 430-31 (1965) (allowing lost profits damages for wrongful removal of
house from property).
302. See Gonzales, 56 Cal. App. 4th at 477, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 481 (allowing
emotional distress damages where the plaintiffs personal belongings were
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Misappropriation of eggs and embryos qualifies for this second
measure of damages for at least three reasons. First, because the
misappropriation affects the donors' deepest personal interests,3 0 4 it
cannot be termed "ordinary." Second, with widely varying prices
being offered for eggs and embryos, establishing a market value for
them is problematic as well as unsatisfying.30 5 Third, the replevin
remedy will not provide redress in this situation.30 6 Yet some rem-
edy for the misappropriation is needed, and to avoid injustice, a
money remedy must be fashioned. This can be achieved by using the
second measure of damages provided in the California statute.
Determining appropriate compensation is difficult where an item
is not completely commodified. °7 Yet in our jurisprudence, lack of
commensurability does not mean lack of compensibility.0 8 Our le-
gal system recognizes that even where losses are not mathematically
commensurable with dollar amounts, monetary compensation may
provide some solace to victims by "recognizing the wrong and signi-
fying its weightiness." 30 9 For example, dignitary torts, like non-
harmful batteries and denial of the right to vote,310 support damages
converted).
303. See supra notes 295-97 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 31-41 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 248-49 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 282-89 and accompanying text.
307. See RADiN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 15, at 187-89. Ra-
din comments, "If corrective justice requires rectification, and if injury cannot
be translated into money, how can payment of money ever amount to rectifica-
tion, so as to satisfy the demands of corrective justice? The problem, an im-
portant one, has been too little noticed, perhaps because the connection be-
tween compensation and commensurability has been too little noticed." Id. at
191.
308. See 1 DOBBS, supra note 281 § 3.1, at 277-78; Arora, 860 F. Supp. at
1100 (stating that "mere difficulty in ascertaining damages is not a basis for
denying them").
309. RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 15, at 195 (citing Louis
L. Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 219, 224 (1953)); see also 1 DOBBS, supra note 281 § 3.1,
at 282
310. Dignitary torts have been defined as "injuries to one's personality or the
dignity one has as a person." J. Martin Burke & Michael K. Friel, Getting
Physical: Excluding Personal Injury Awards Under the New Section 104(a)(2),
58 MONT. L. REv. 167, 179 (1997). Where bodily interests are involved, dig-
nitary interests rest "not only in our bodily integrity, but in our dignity."
Sharon Nan Perley, Note, From Control Over One's Body to Control Over
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awards even though the awards are not commensurable with a pecu-
niary value.311 The misappropriation of eggs and embryos bears
some similarity to dignitary torts, 312 because it involves an injury to
aspects at the very core of human dignity, sexuality and reproduc-
tion. Just as remedies are fashioned for dignitary torts, they can also
be devised for the misappropriation of human reproductive material.
Where market value is difficult to fix, some courts have awarded
the cost of replacing the converted material.313 This remedy was ap-
plied to a human body product in United States v. Arora3 14 where the
court awarded the cost of recreating a converted human cell line.
315
This remedy may yield substantial damages in fertility treatment,
where the costs of retrieving the reproductive material are high.316
Other measures of damages may also be available. Various
kinds of nonpecuniary harm, most notably pain and suffering and
emotional distress, are compensated under the tort system, some-
times resulting in "substantial damages." 317 For misappropriation of
human eggs and embryos, courts could award emotional distress
damages, for which there is precedent in existing conversion law.
318
There is also precedent for awarding damages for the "special and
intrinsic value" of the converted material, as has been done with
items such as personal collections, antiques, and photographs.
319
One s Body Parts: Extending The Doctrine of Informed Consent, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 335, 350 (1992) (arguing that "we retain dignitary interests in what hap-
pens to our tissues and cells, even after they have been removed from our
bodies").
311. See 1 DOBBS, supra note 281 § 3.1, at 281.
312. See Perley, supra note 310, at 350 (identifying a dignitary interest in
human cells and tissues).
313. See Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg. v. Quinn, 604 A.2d 535, 542-43 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1992) (awarding replacement value of lost household items);
Rajkovich v. Alfred Mossner Co., 557 N.E.2d 496, 500 (III. App. Ct. 1990)
(allowing recovery for architect's time to redo damaged architectural draw-
ings).
314. 860 F. Supp. 1091 (D. Md. 1994).
315. Seeid. at 1100.
316. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
317. See 1 DOBBS, supra note 281 § 3.1, at 281.
318. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
319. See Walters v. Hatcher, 41 B.R. 511, 514 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984)
(awarding amount to compensate for special value of antiques, collections, and
photograph of plaintiff's mother).
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Finally, courts might also analogize loss of an embryo to loss of a
fetus, for which damages have been awarded.32 °
Against the wrongdoers, any of these measures might result in
substantial awards321 that would approach adequate compensation of
the aggrieved plaintiffs and serve to deter the offending behavior.
They may also be accompanied by punitive damages. Because some
degree of wrongful intent is required for punitive damages, they are
not automatically awarded for conversion claims.322  However, a
converter's conduct will often demonstrate the needed malice, 323 as it
might in the UCI cases, where the doctors' conduct was arguably de-
liberate.
324
320. See, e.g., Gullborg v. Rizzo, 331 F.2d 557, 560-61 (3d Cir. 1964)
(awarding damages for death of unborn fetus of $5,000 based upon present
value of prospective earnings less anticipated maintenance expense taking into
account that the deceased unborn's father is a college graduate).
321. See, e.g., Gonzales, 56 Cal. App. 4th at 468-69 n.1, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
475 n.1 (awarding damages of $232,582 in emotional distress damages for the
conversion of woman's personal items including the only photograph of a de-
ceased child).
322. See Hicks v. Lilly Enters., 608 P.2d 186, 189 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (stat-
ing that punitive damages are appropriate in conversion cases only where there
has been a "particularly aggravated disregard of the rights of the victim")
(quoting Noe v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 435 P.2d 306, 308 (Or. 1967)); Staub v.
Staub, 376 A.2d 1129, 1133-34 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (disallowing puni-
tive damages where converter acted in good faith).
323. See, e.g., Roberson v. Ammons, 477 So.2d 957, 961 (Ala. 1985) (hold-
ing evidence that car was converted in knowing violation of plaintiffs rights
supported award of punitive damages); Krusi v. Bear, Steams & Co., 144 Cal.
App. 3d 664, 679-80, 192 Cal. Rptr. 793, 803 (1983) (holding that substantial
evidence supported jury's findings that stock brokerage firm's conversion of
stock was malicious and supported award of punitive damages); Molenaar v.
United Cattle Co., 553 N.W.2d 424, 428-29 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (holding
punitive damages recoverable for conversion of livestock where defendant
acted in deliberate disregard for the rights or safety of others); Hicks, 608 P.2d
at 189 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (upholding award of punitive damages where jury
could have found defendant wilfully converted some of plaintiff's property
without a good faith belief it was entitled to have the property).
324. See Arora, 860 F. Supp. at 1101 (holding that the researcher's inten-
tional and malicious conversion of a cell line supported an award of punitive
damages). In California, punitive damages may be awarded when there is
clear and convincing evidence of malice, fraud, or oppression, some or all of
which would appear easily provable against physicians who engage in con-
scious or reckless misuse of reproductive material. See CAL. CIV. CODE §
3294 (West 1997). Whether punitive damages could also be awarded against
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The Moore court was particularly concerned about the potential
assessment of damages against innocent converters of tissue-that is,
medical researchers-if it allowed a conversion claim.32 5 In the egg
and embryo cases, the real wrongdoer is typically a physician or
other health care provider who acts either intentionally or negli-
gently-that is, who bears some moral blame. But the Moore court's
concern about innocent third parties draws attention to the gesta-
tional parents, who presumably would be innocent. Having exer-
cised dominion over the reproductive material in contravention of the
donors' rights, they would be converters. 326  However, concerns
about their liability can be allayed by reference to the doctrine of ac-
cession.
That doctrine provides that "if materials of one person are com-
bined or united with the materials of another by skill and labor,
forming a single, joint product, the owner of the principal materials
which go to make up the whole acquires by accession the right of
property in the whole."327 Most courts require the enhanced item to
be substantially different from the old.328 Although this language
seems startling when applied to human tissue, 329 the concept is nev-
ertheless applicable: the mother in whom the egg or embryo is im-
planted adds effort and her own bodily products in order to nurture
the developing fetus and give birth to the child, who easily satisfies
the requirement of substantial difference from the original material.
The doctrine of accession would therefore cut off any right of the
an employer such as UCI would depend on whether the plaintiffs met the stat-
ute's requirement to show an employer's participation in or ratification of the
offending conduct. See id.
325. See Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 144-45, 793 P.2d at 494-95, 271 Cal. Rptr. at
161-62.
326. See id. at 144, 793 P.2d at 494, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
327. 1 AM. JUR. 2DAccession and Confusion § 1 (1994).
328. See id.; Laura K. W. Rebbe, Note, Misrepresentation, Conversion, and
Commercial Human Tissue Research, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 643, 665 (1988).
329. The Moore court did not explicitly apply this doctrine. Instead, it dealt
with the changed character of the cells through reference to patent law. See
Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 141-42, 793 P.2d at 159-60, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 492-93.
Because patents are permitted for products of "human ingenuity" but not for
naturally occurring organisms, and because this cell line was patented, the
court found it "factually and legally distinct" from Moore's cells and therefore
not subject to his ownership. Id.
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plaintiffs to replevin of the child.330 The gestational parents could,
however, still be liable for damages.
331
These damages could be nominal. In accession cases, an inno-
cent converter is not responsible for the entire enhanced value of the
converted item but merely for the value of the original misappropri-
ated item or the value of the enhanced property minus the converter's
costs and labor.332 In California, where a manifest justice rule ob-
tains,3 33 a court could decide to assess only nominal damages
334
against a couple who innocently received a misappropriated egg or
embryo. Thus the concern about the innocent gestational parents
need not be an obstacle to pursuing the real wrongdoer for conver-
sion.
The concern about third party researchers is less convincing
with reproductive material than it is with spleen cells. In fertility
treatment, gametes are taken not for research purposes, but rather to
initiate pregnancies. Although some research may be done on hu-
man reproductive material,335 society should not approve of its deliv-
ery to researchers without the donors' consent. Allowing for conver-
sion claims will provide a meaningful incentive for researchers to be
certain they have the necessary consent before receiving eggs or em-
bryos. If mistakes occur and researchers are truly innocent, they
could be protected from large damage awards in the same way as in-
nocent gestational parents.
330. See id.; John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a "Parent"?
The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv.
353, 393 (1991). See also discussion of replevin, supra notes 282-89 and ac-
companying text.
331. See 1 AM. JUR. 2DAccession and Confusion § 13 (1994).
332. See id.
333. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3336 (West 1991); see also Lint, 121 Cal. App.
3d at 624-25, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 319 (awarding damages for loss of use of con-
verted property rather than for interest where the former measure was neces-
sary to adequately compensate the plaintiff).
334. See Cincinnati & Suburban Bell Tel. Co. v. Carter Constr. Co., 216
N.E.2d 885, 886 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966) (one dollar in nominal damages
awarded where plaintiff could not show reasonableness of costs to repair con-
verted telephone cable).
335. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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B. Other Tort Claims Do Not Eliminate the Need for a Conversion
Claim
In its holding on misappropriation of spleen cells, the California
Supreme Court said that a conversion claim was not necessary be-
cause the plaintiffs had other tort claims available, such as breach of
fiduciary duty and lack of informed consent,336 which Justice Mosk
referred to collectively as nondisclosure claims.337 Depending on the
facts, these claims might be available in misappropriation of egg or
embryo cases. However, they have been described as "largely illu-
sory. ',338 To establish them, patients must meet a difficult burden:
339
they must show that they would not have consented to undergo the
procedure and that no reasonable person would have undergone it if
properly informed of the doctors' intent to transfer the reproductive
material to others.340 In light of the intense desire of fertility patients
to become parents,341 this burden would be difficult to meet. Jurors
might not believe that neither this patient, nor any reasonable patient,
would have undergone the fertility procedures had they received full
disclosure. Moreover, in an informed consent claim the patient must
show that the withheld information was known or should have been
336. See Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 147, 793 P.2d at 496-97, 271 Cal. Rptr. at
163-64.
337. See id. at 178-79 & n.24, 793 P.2d at 518-19 & n.24, 271 Cal. Rptr. at
185-86 & n.24 (Mosk, J. dissenting). The majority also saw these as a single
claim for "invading a legally protected interest" of the patient. Id. at 128-29,
793 P.2d at 483, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
338. Id. at 179, 793 P.2d at 519, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 186 (Mosk, J., dissenting)
(explaining that, to recover on an informed consent claim, the plaintiff must
prove that neither he nor any reasonable patient would have had the procedure
if completely informed). See also Leeds, supra note 193, at 586 (criticizing
the court as placing undue reliance on the availability of other claims, which
really are "paper tiger[s]").
339. See id.; see also K. Peter Ritter, Note, Moore v. Regents of the Univer-
sity of California: A Splenetic Debate Over Ownership of Human Tissue, 21
Sw. U. L. REv. 1465, 1486 (1992) (discussing difficulty of meeting burden for
informed consent claim).
340. See Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 179, 793 P.2d at 519, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 186
(Mosk, J., dissenting) (citing Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104
Cal. Rptr. 505 (Cal. 1972)). Although Justice Mosk followed California law,
he pointed out that both the subjective and the objective requirements represent
the majority rule. See id. at 179 n.25, 180 n.26, 793 P.2d at 519 n.25, 520
n.26, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 186 n.25, 187 n.26 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
341. See supra notes 31-41 and accompanying text.
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known to the physician at the time of the procedure.34 2 But the mis-
appropriation may not be planned, occurring instead as a result of
later decisions or sloppy practices. In such instances, the wrongdoer
could escape liability under this theory, which would fail to vindicate
the patients' rights.
343
Restricting recovery to the nondisclosure claims also omits some
potential defendants who ought to be held responsible. Standing out-
side the fiduciary relationship would be defendants such as third
party physicians or researchers who receive eggs or embryos from
the original physicians. 344 These third parties ought to be encour-
aged to obtain valid consent before they accept reproductive material
from another source, and the presence of potential conversion liabil-
ity would provide such encouragement.
Emotional distress claims are also proposed as alternatives to
conversion, but either intentional or negligent emotional distress
claims will fail in many jurisdictions on these facts, since many
states require actual physical harm or impact for these claims.
345
Restricting aggrieved couples to these other claims would divert
attention from their real injury, which is the taking of their eggs or
embryos. A conversion claim is the most direct way to acknowledge
and redress this taking. The existence of other less direct claims is
no reason for disallowing the direct and analytically sound claim of
conversion.
342. See Arato v. Avedon, 5 Cal. 4th 1172, 1186, 858 P.2d 598, 607, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 131, 140 (1993); Bloskas v. Murray, 646 P.2d 907, 912-13 (Colo.
1982); Cummings v. Fondak, 474 N.Y.S. 2d 356, 361-62 (N.Y. App. Term
1983). A physician's economic interest that might effect his judgment has
been held to be information that must be disclosed. See Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at
129-30, 793 P.2d at 483-84, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 150-51.
343. See Ritter, supra note 339, at 1486.
344. See Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 181, 793 P.2d at 521, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 188
(Mosk, J., dissenting).
345. See Andrews, My Body, My Property, supra note 229, at 30 (stating that
at the time of her article, only nine states would allow a negligent infliction of
emotional distress claim, and twelve would not even allow an intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress for misappropriation of reproductive material).
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V. CONCLUSION: A CONVERSION CLAIM SHOULD BE AVAILABLE
FOR MISAPPROPRIATION OF HUMAN EGGS OR EMBRYOS
Misappropriation of human eggs and embryos is occurring with
disturbing frequency. Against the background of the Moore case,
which held that there was no conversion claim for misappropriation
of human spleen cells, questions have arisen about the applicability
of conversion claims to misappropriation of human eggs and em-
bryos. A relational analysis of this issue focuses on enhancing the
personhood of the affected individuals. Under this analysis, recog-
nizing that reproductive material partakes of enough incidents of
property to support a conversion claim will accord appropriate
weight to the couples' sense of violation and betrayal and allow for
redress. Requiring couples to rely on other less direct or even illu-
sory claims devalues the real and substantial injury to their person-
hood when their reproductive material is taken from them and mis-
used.
The elasticity of the common law has historically allowed it to
accommodate to changing times and circumstances. Conversion is
an analytically sound and fitting claim where eggs or embryos are
misappropriated. Courts need not shrink from applying this estab-
lished claim merely because new technological developments are in-
volved.
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APPENDIX
DEFINITIONS OF SCIENTIFIC TERMS
These terms are used in this article with the following meanings:
EGG means the unfertilized female reproductive cell.346
EMBRYO means the developing human organism from concep-
tion to the second month.
347
FERTILIZATION means the initial union of the egg and sperm.
348
GAMETE means a mature germ cell (either sperm or ovum) pos-
sessing a haploid chromosome set and capable of initiating for-
mation of a new individual by fusion with another gamete.
349
IN VITRO (literally, "in glass") means a laboratory procedure
performed in an artificial environment outside of the women's
body.
350
OvuM means a female gamete.
35 1
PREEBRYO means the fertilized egg in the initial phase of hu-
man development, beginning with the first cell division, and
continuing for about fourteen days until it takes on the charac-
teristics of a true embryo.
352
SPERM means a male gamete.
353
ZYGOTE means the diploid cell resulting from the union of
sperm and ovum.
354
346. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 726 (3d ed.
1986) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S].
347. See id. at 559.
348. See J. E. SCHMIDT, ATTORNEY'S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE, Vol. 2, F-
56 (1993).
349. See WEBSTER'S, supra note 346, at 933.
350. See Elizabeth Ann Pitrolo, The Birds, The Bees, and the Deep Freeze:
Is There International Consensus in the Debate Over Assisted Reproductive
Technologies?, 19 HOUS. J. INT'LL. 147, 152 (1996).
351. See WEBSTER'S, supra note 346, at 1613.
352. See CLIFFORD GROBSTEIN, SCIENCE AND THE UNBORN 58-59 (1988).
Scientists now view the term preembryo as more accurate than the term em-
bryo for the first stages of development of the fertilized egg. See id. at 58-62.
Because many lay writers, including courts, do not distinguish between an em-
bryo and a preembryo, this article uses the term "embryo" to refer to both ex-
cept where there is a specific reason to distinguish between the two concepts.
353. See WEBSTER'S, supra note 346, at 2191.
354. See PHYSICIANS DESK REFERENCE MEDICAL DICTIONARY: MEDICAL
ECONOMICS 1976 (1995).
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